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A step towards peace in Aceh 
An agreement on the cessation of hostilities signed by the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh 
Movement in December is a major step towards peace and a just political solution for the conflict in 
Aceh. The signing of the agreement has already helped to improve the situation in Aceh where armed 
clashes between the two forces have declined significantly in recent weeks. However, difficulties could 
emerge in the weeks and months ahead. 
The agreement was signed on 9 December 2002. The two 
delegations had shown the necessary political will to reach 
an agreement. In addition, political forces around the world, 
including the US, the UK, France, the Scandinavian coun-
tries, Japan and Switzerland were actively involved in the 
process, as well as the European Union, the UN and the 
World Bank. The accord has certainly put the Aceh ques-
tion onto the international agenda. 
So far the peace accord has had a favourable impact on 
the situation in Aceh. In many parts of the region, armed 
clashes have declined and Free Aceh Movement (GAM) 
units have returned to their bases. In its first report issued a 
few weeks after the agreement, the Joint Security Council 
(JSC), the body charged with implementing the accord and 
monitoring the situation on the ground reported a signifi-
cant decrease in the number of civilian fatalities. Whereas 
during the first eleven months of 2002, there were on aver-
age 87 deaths a month, in the weeks following the accord, 
the figure was down to eleven. 
In some places GAM units even have invited their adver-
~aries, the security troops, to join them in traditional festiv-
ities which would have been unthinkable a few months ago. 
However, for nearly three decades Aceh has been a war 
zone and it will take a lot of time and effort to restore a 
sense of peace and security for its people. 
A week before the accord was signed in Geneva, a confer-
ence on Aceh was held in Tokyo. The Preparatory 
Conference on Peace and Reconstruction focussed attention 
on economic developments in Aceh. The objective of the 
meeting, which was also attended by the Indonesian 
government and GAM, was to make clear the determination 
of the international community to provide economic assis-
tance to a secure and peaceful Aceh. The World Bank has 
recently sent four teams to Aceh to assess basic needs in 
order to tackle the economic, social and governmental 
needs of the region. 
On 14 January, the ambassadors of the US, Japan and Italy 
(representing the EU) visited Banda Aceh in a further 
display of support for the peace agreement. US ambassador 
Ralph Boyce said: 'We are here to celebrate and honour the 
signing of the cessation of hostilities agreement ..... Our 
work and our support will be, of course, dependent on the 
security environment'. The Japanese ambassador Yutaka 
Limura said: 'Peace in Aceh is like a new born baby. All 
sides, including us, must look after this baby'. Two key 
ministers accompanied the ambassadors, the Co-ordinating 
Minister for Security and Political Affairs Susilo Bambang 
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Yudhoyono and the Minister of Trade and Industry Rini 
Suwandi. It was Yudhoyono, a retired general and the most 
senior minister in Megawati's government, who played a 
key role in the negotiations with GAM in Geneva. 
The HDC's crucial role 
The body which facilitated the accord was the HDC, the 
Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, more commonly known 
as the Henri Dunant Centre. Often criticised in the past for 
being unprofessional and slow to act, the HDC was 
confronted with what looked like an impossible task. It is 
indeed rare for negotiations of a conflict of this magnitude 
to be facilitated by an NGO but the HDC successfully 
achieved an important step on the road to peace in Aceh. 
When negotiations first started two years ago, Acehnese 
Demo in Banda Aceh supporting the implementation of the 
cessation of hostilities. 
people were very enthusiastic and expected quick results 
but when this failed to materialise, they became disheart-
ened. But the new accord has been met with great enthusi-
asm and there is a sense of huge relief that for now at least, 
the atmosphere is more peaceful and people can go about 
their daily business without fear. Some of the structures 
provided for in earlier agreements to secure the involve-
ment of Acehnese civil society barely functioned because of 
the negative attitude of TNI/POLRI, the Indonesian security 
forces and police. They have always seen the HDC as an 
interfering intruder and have obstructed their work as much 
as possible. Back in July 2001, for example, the police 
arrested four members of the GAM negotiating team, which 
was a very serious breach of faith and a deliberate attempt 
to sabotage the talks. 
The first two years of negotiations were indeed difficult 
and it was only thanks to the patience and persistence of the 
HDC staff and the GAM negotiators who, for security 
reasons, stayed at the same hotel as the HDC personnel, that 
things began to pay off. In the meantime international 
support for the HDC continued to be strong with financial 
support coming from Norway and the US. 
Gradually the HDC managed to give the negotiations a 
stronger international dimension by securing the involve-
ment of four senior politicians from other countries. These 
four 'wise men' played a crucial role in the talks: Major-
General Anthony Zinni of the US who was also the US envoy 
for the Middle East talks, former Thai foreign minister Surin 
Pitsuwan, Budimir Linchar, former foreign minister of 
Yugoslavia and Bengt Soderbergh, former deputy foreign 
minister of Sweden. These men helped to create new open-
ings at a time when the talks seemed to be going nowhere. 
There has been significant international pressure on 
Jakarta for the talks to succeed, while the governments 
involved have invariably reiterated support for Indonesia's 
territorial integrity, which cuts across GAM's ultimate aim 
of independence from Indonesia. International pressure on 
GAM also intensified, along with a demand that they accept 
NAD, the special autonomy status offered by Jakarta. This 
is something that GAM has certainly not done. 
In late October 2002, the two sides prepared drafts which 
were far apart on many issues. The Indonesian draft made it 
clear that GAM would have to accept NAD, which meant 
virtual surrender. In early November, the talks seemed to be 
going nowhere and were on the brink of collapse. GAM 
demanded more time to confer with representatives of 
Acehnese civil society. The HDC complied with this 
request and two delegations representing different strands 
of civil society were invited to Geneva. A new round of 
talks was held and on this occasion, the two sides were able 
to reach agreement. 
The first paragraph of the accord reads as follows: 
On the basis of the NAD Law as a starting point, as 
discussed on 2-3 February 2002, (leading to) a democratic 
all-inclusive dialogue involving all elements of Acehnese 
society that will be facilitated by the HDC in Aceh. This 
process will seek to review elements of the NAD Law 
through the expression of the views of the Acehnese people 
in a free and safe manner. This will lead to the election of a 
democratic government in Aceh, Indonesia. 
The wording is somewhat disjointed but includes essential 
elements for a solution, needing to be fleshed out. 
Possible stumbling blocks 
The accord is the result of compromise and is only the first 
step on the road towards the resolution of the conflict in 
Aceh. There is no denying that major problems could 
emerge. First and foremost is the fact that there is a huge 
discrepancy between the political will of the Jakarta 
government which negotiated the accord and the military 
and police who operate in Aceh. 
One of the most contentious issues is the withdrawal of 
Indonesian troops and the storage (or de-commissioning) of 
GAM's weapons, arms and ordinance in designated places. 
The accord avoids using that term 'withdrawal' with regard 
to the security forces in Aceh and speaks instead of 'reloca-
tion' . The TNI is not likely to allow its troops to leave Aceh, 
if only on the basis that the army's territorial system 
requires their continued preserice. 'Relocation' can be inter-
preted as meaning something quite different. 
The accord states that within three months, TNI troops 
should be 'relocated'. There are estimated to be 28,000 TNI 
troops stationed in Aceh and as yet, there are no signs of any 
of them departing. The storage of weapons by GAM is 
required to happen simultaneously and GAM Foreign 
Minister Dr Zaini Abdullah has made it clear that this will 
be contingent on what happens regarding the 'relocation' of 
Indonesian troops. 
Other contentious issues like the holding of democratic 
elections and the setting up of an All Inclusive Dialogue 
between the Acehnese are also far from settled. Jakarta 
interprets the elections as being the elections that are due to 
be held throughout the country in 2004, in which only 
nationally-based parties can take part. So, will GAM be 
allowed to take part? If the election is seen as an opportu-
nity to test the support for independence from Indonesia, 
how will this be reflected? As for the All Inclusive 
Dialogue, nothing has yet been said about the procedure by 
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which the voice of Acehnese civil society will be reflected 
in this process. 
A reconstituted Joint Security Commission (JSC) has been 
appointed under the leadership of Major General 
Thanongsak Tuwinan, a senior Thai military officer. The 
JSC has the difficult task of monitoring the security situa-
tion and making sure that implementation of the agreement 
goes ahead as agreed. The JSC will consist of 150 persons, 
composed of three groups, fifty each from the HDC, 
Indonesia and GAM. 
Under the terms of the accord, the maintenance oflaw and 
order is the responsibility of the Indonesian police (POLRI). 
During the negotiations, GAM made a big issue of the role 
of Brimob, the crack police troops which have played a 
particularly brutal role in Aceh, and pressed for these troops 
to be withdrawn., but this was not agreed. Instead the 
accord says: ' .. In this context, the mandate and mission of 
Brimob will be reformulated to strictly conform to regular 
police activities and as such will no longer initiate offensive 
. . 
. ACEH 
negotiators based in Banda Aceh, the capital, showed in 
July 200 l. At the same time additional troops were sent to 
Aceh, a clear challenge from the TNI to President Wahid 
that the military would not accept any negotiations on Aceh 
that involved an international body like the HDC. 
This attitude by the military has not changed much but 
there have been shifts at cabinet level in Jakarta. Senior 
cabinet ministers in the Megawati cabinet now realise that a 
military victory over GAM is impossible and negotiations 
are the only way ahead. 
The issue of justice 
Many important issues have not been dealt with in the 
peace accord, notably the issue of justice and the matter of 
IDPs (internally displaced persons). Recent figures 
published by the human rights organisation Kontras provide 
an alarming account of victims of human rights violations. 
From January till November 2002, almost five thousand 
cases were recorded, including killings, disappearances, 
torture and arbitrary detention, perpe-
trated by the Indonesian security forces. 
From 1989 till 1998, more commonly 
known as the DOM period, when 
special military operations were under-
way in Aceh, tens of thousands of 
Acehnese were victims of military 
brutality. None of the perpetrators has 
been brought to justice. 
TN/ troops patrolling in the Aceh countryside. Hopefully this will end soon 
Already, civil society organisations 
have criticised the accord for failing to 
deal with this issue and are clearly 
determined to keep the issue alive. This 
will be an important political struggle as 
the armed forces commander in chief, 
General Endriartono Sutarto insisted, 
within days of the accord being signed, 
that bringing perpetrators to justice 
'would be damaging to peace' . 
actions against members of GAM not in contravention of 
the Agreement'. It remains to be seen how this will be 
implemented in the weeks to come. 
How the negotiations started 
The negotiations facilitated by the HDC started in 2000 
and resulted in a three-month peace accord called a 
Humanitarian Pause [see TAPOL Bulletin No. 158, June 
2000]. This was during the presidency of Abdurrahman 
Wahid, who was eager to find a peaceful solution to the 
hostilities but was at loggerheads with the military through-
out his rule. From the outset the humanitarian pause was 
sabotaged by the military. Acehnese human rights activists 
reported an escalation of violence by the military, an 
increase of road blocks and the emergence of 'unidentified 
persons' carrying out assaults, robberies, kidnappings and 
acts of arson against public facilities. 
The initial enthusiasm of the Acehnese people quickly 
dissipated. It was a peace process did not bring peace; on 
the contrary, it only created more violence. While the nego-
tiations continued at a snail's pace, they had little relevance 
to the realities on the ground in Aceh where violence 
continued unabated. 
It was indeed a difficult process as the arrest of the GAM 
While the number of civilian fatalities has 
declined following the December accord, there is no indica-
tion that the number of IDPs has decreased. As reported by 
PCC (People's Crisis Centre) the number of ID P's in 
December 2002 was 33,158, more than 50 per cent higher 
than in December 2001 (21,578). On 14 January it was 
reported that 2,500 IDPs who fled eight villages in North 
Aceh in December fearing attack have returned home, 
escorted by nine JSC peace monitors. 
Clashes still occur 
While there have been positive reports in the press, armed . 
incidents continue to occur. Since the signing of the deal at 
least 12 civilians, 3 GAM members and 4 members of the 
security forces have been killed, according to an HDC 
report. Other reports mention that around 600 villagers in 
East Aceh have refused to go back to their villages because 
they are still traumatised. However, initial reports from 
Aceh are overwhelmingly positive and it is up to the people 
of Aceh to do everything they can to create conducive 
conditions throughout the region and exert continuous pres-
sure on those in charge of implementation of the accord to 
listen to the wishes of the people. * 
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The Bali blast and beyond 
On 12 October, three bombs exploded in Legian, a beach resort on the island of Bali, killing at least 
180 people and wounding hundreds. The blast was unprecedented, the worst incident since the Twin 
Towers tragedy in New York. The three bombs exploded almost simultaneously at Renon (close to the 
US consulate), Paddy's Cafe and Sari Club at Kuta beach. Some analysts believe that local terrorist 
cells working in conjunction with the Al Qaeda international network were responsible but in 
Indonesia, the focus has been on home-grown groups. 
In the last three years Indonesia has experienced more the eighties, there was a loose network of Muslim commu-
than a hundred terrorist bombings. In the wake of the Bali nities in Central Java called usroh (family) with common 
blast, three men, Amrozy, Imam Samudra and Muklas were ideas about moral self-improvement, guidance and self-help 
arrested; while the arrests appear to be providing leads, they leading to a pure Muslim society. Many of their ideas were 
have left many questions unanswered. borrowed from the Egyptian movement Al-Ikhwan a/-
No one had foreseen an attack on the tourist island of Bali Muslimun. Another common feature was their defiance of 
but in hindsight it is clear that soft targets, hotels and night Suharto, who was imposing Pancasila as the state ideology, 
clubs like Paddy's Cafe and Sari Club in Kuta Beach, which much to the dismay of many Muslim groups. 1 
are patronised mainly by white people, have been targets At the time, Jema'ah Islamiyah simply meant an umbrella 
elsewhere. The attack on a hotel in Mombasa, Kenya and for Muslim groups which were victims of state repression. 
the killing of three American doctors in Yemen only Many usroh members were tried and given heavy sentences 
r:-~~~-"-~~~~~~~~~~~___;::;_~~__, ...... _____ ___ 
strengthen this conclusion. 
The relentless campaign against global terrorism by 
the Bush Administration has so far produced meagre 
results and none of the key suspects has been arrested. 
The 'war on terror' has made the world far less safe. 
These days, people everywhere can become targets for 
terrorist attacks. 
Contrasting perceptions 
The many bomb attacks in Indonesia since the fall of 
Suharto have led to public · indifference in Indonesia. 
Most of the outrages have not been resolved. The 
terrorist acts are widely seen as an extension of state 
terrorism, carried out with the co-operation of sections 
of state intelligence units or special army units. 
This is in stark contrast with how things are perceived 
in the rest of the world. The US administration is 
convinced of the presence of an Al Qaeda network in 
Indonesia. In Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines, 
the authorities have been busy mopping up alleged 
terrorist networks. While they focus attention on 
Jema'ah Islamiyah (JI) , it is hardly seen as a threat 
in Indonesia. According to Singapore and Malaysian intelli-
gence reports, JI is Al Qaeda's arm in the region and its ring-
leaders are mainly Indonesian though no one seems to know 
whether JI is a highly structured organisation of terror or 
simply a loose network of cells oflike-minded people. While 
many Indonesians are not convinced about this 'terrorist 
threat', the US and the UN have placed it on their lists of 
terrorist organisations. Gradually an international consensus 
has emerged, portraying JI in the same light as Al Qaeda and 
it now seems to be taken for granted that the perpetrators of 
the Bali blast were Al-Qaeda connected. 
But in Indonesia, commentators believe that the suspects 
are home-grown criminals and are far more cautious about 
linking these acts with global terrorism. . 
In Indonesia, Jema'ah Islamiyah has a more generic 
meaning, being the Arabic term for 'Muslim community'. In 
The site after the terrorist act 
for attending small, home-based religious gatherings, but 
they did not face charges of terrorism. 
However, these days in Southeast Asia, Jema'ah 
Islamiyah as used by police and intelligence authorities has 
become synonymous with terrorism. The Singapore govern-
ment has even issued a white paper on the connections 
between Al-Qaeda and Jema'ah Islamiyah and several anti-
terrorism experts have branded JI as a terrorist organisation. 
Greater caution in Jakarta 
The Megawati government's handling of global terrorism 
has been more cautious. While it has focused on surveil-
lance and monitoring alleged suspects, the governments in 
Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines have been engaged 
in pro-active policies like Washington, smashing up 
suspected cells and arresting scores of people. Long before 
the top suspect Abubakar Ba'asyir was arrested in 
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Indonesia, the authorities in Singapore and Malaysia were against Iraq have provoked a new wave of anti-
baying for his arrest and depicting him as the ringleader. Americanism, even surpassing anti-US sentiments during 
This gap in perception also explains the difference in the Vietnam war. According to an opinion poll in Indonesia 
reporting. The world media tends to link the Bali blast with soon after the Bali blast, some 80 per cent of Indonesians 
int~rnational terrorist networks, linking JI with Al-Qaeda, believed the CIA was behind the Bali outrage. 
while the Indonesian press is more focused on the domestic During the war on Afghanistan, the US embassy in Jakarta 
nature of the plot. The differing approaches has led to was the scene of daily protests. One has to go back to the 
--- sixties to see such vehement denunciations of US 
policies but the protesters were all Muslim 
groups, a new breed of organisations with a 
specific political agenda. 
There are many reasons why pious Muslims 
have turned against Washington. In the eighties, 
the first generation of Indonesian Muslim radi-
cals campaigned against the Soviet Union in 
Afghanistan and saw the Americans as friends 
but friends have now become enemies. 
On a global scale the role of Osama bin Laden 
has become peripheral, if indeed he is still alive. 
But the movement of Muslim activists in the 
present unhealthy global atmosphere is a breed-
ing ground for 'freelance operators' who are not 
necessarily aligned to Al-Qaeda. 
Anti-Islam policies in Indonesia 
Abubakar Ba'asyir in hospital visited by his lawyer A.B. Nasution 
Since the birth of the Indonesian republic, the 
attitude oflndonesian governments towards radi-
cal Muslim groups has lurched from one extreme 
to the other, from accommodation to repression. 
conflicts within the armed forces and intelligence bodies. 
Since 11 September, US intelligence organisations have 
been seeking allies around the world against Osama bin 
Laden. Indonesia's National Intelligence Body, BIN, fell for 
this line and actively helped Washington. In at least two 
instances, terrorist suspects were seized from their homes 
and flown illegally to Egypt and Afghanistan for interroga-
tion. This collaboration between BIN and the CIA angered 
senior police and military officers. 
In the post-Suharto era, administrations have been far 
more circumspect about rounding up alleged political 
suspects, leading to complaints in Washington about 
Jakarta's lack of action. While governments in Malaysia and 
Singapore have arrested people under their draconian ISA 
laws, post-Suharto Indonesia has until now shown greater 
respect for civil rights. Some 70 people have been detained 
in Malaysia while Singapore is holding 31 persons under 
terrorist suspicions. The Singapore has issued a white paper 
on the connections between Jema'ah Islamiyah and Al-
Qaeda based on the testimonies of the 31 detained. The 
conclusions of the paper are quite grim and basically state 
that the global jihad threat over Southeast Asia is still immi-
nent. The Indonesian National Police Chief Gener~} Da'i 
Bachtiar takes a different position and stated in a seminar 
held in Singapore that so far the multinational police inves-
tigations in the Bali blast events has not unearthed any 
evidence linking JI and Al-Qaeda. 
A presidential decree on terrorism has now been intro-
duced (see separate article) by the Jakarta government and 
the anti-terrorism law which will replace it, now being 
rushed through the parliament, may reverse this. 
Growing anti-US sentiments 
Another feature is growing anti-US sentiment around the 
world. Washington's pro-Israel policy and its plans for war 
The Muslim groups now in the limelight, in partic-
ular in the context of the Bali blast and the present anti-US 
wave, are all relatively new. Some are part of an interna-
tional network. The liberal Muslim scholar Ulil Absar-
Abdalla calls it a 'Gerakan Islam baru' (new Muslim move-
ment) as distinct from the 'old' mainstream Muslim organi-
sations, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) or Muhammadiyah which 
represent at least 80 per cent oflndonesian Muslims.2 
The radicalisation of Islam has been fuelled by the Soviet 
and US wars in Afghanistan and the availability of training 
facilities in Sudan, Pakistan, Yemen and Afghanistan. 
Members of the new groups do not generally come from the 
mainstream organisations. Their social background is from 
the ranks of syncretic Muslims, from abangan communitie& 
as distinct from the pious Muslim communities across many 
parts o~ Central and East J~va. Some of the key suspects of 
the Bah blast can be descnbed as 'reborn' Muslims.3 
MM! (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia), the Council of Jihad 
Fighters, is one such organisation, a loose umbrella set up in 
2000 by Muslim clerics with strong anti-Suharto credentials. 
MMI's paramilitary wing, Laskar Mujahidin, is active in 
Maluku. Its most prominent preacher is Abubakar Ba'asyir 
who runs a small school in Ngruki, in Solo, Central Java 
called Pesantren al Mukmin. He is also seen at home and 
abroad as the spiritual leader of Jema'ah Islamiyah. He 
openly supports the views of Osama bin Laden which makes 
him an obvious target of the world's press. Ba'asyir was 
hounded during the anti-Muslim witch-hunt in the eighties 
and fled to Malaysia for 14 years until the fall of Suharto. 
1:fMI cam~aigns for the introduction of Syariah law not just 
~n Ii:idones1a but throughout the region. It has no clear organ-
1sat1onal structure and no registered membership but is 
supported by the pupils who attend its religious schools. 
Another group with an international dimension is Hizbut 
Tahrir, a spin-off from Ichwanul Muslimin, the Muslim 
Brotherhood ~ovement, known for its radicalism in Egypt 
and Sudan. Like MM!, HT promotes pan-Islamism, and 
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advocates a purity of Islam. HT spokesperson Mohammad and hardline military and/or intelligence officers. 
Ismail Yusanto is virulently anti-US and frequently quotes Indonesianist Ben Anderson, retired professor from 
from Noam Chomsky on anti-US policies . It promotes the Cornell University, believes that the masterminds of the 
introduction of Syariah law and promotes a kind of Pan- Bali outrage may be from a military faction that used to 
Islamism, denouncing national borders.4 control East Timar. They would also be the ones to benefit 
Several leaders of these new groups were prominent from restoring the army's central role in Indonesian politics. 
---- 'It (Bali bombing) is not an international conspir-
Tourists leaving Bali, a devastating impact for the economy 
Muslim leaders in the late seventies and eighties, when the 
Suharto regime persecuted radical Muslim groups. 5 
MM! in particular harbours many ex political prisoners of the 
eighties while HT only emerged into the open in the post-
Suharto era. It is difficult to assess the support for these 
groups. In the 1999 general election, the Muslim vote went 
mostly to mainstream Muslim parties and to Golkar, the 
ruling party under . Suharto. Some voters supported new 
Muslim parties, in particular Partai Keadilan (PK), a party 
with a clear structure and programme. But it should not be 
lumped together with the Muslim groups mentioned above 
which function outside the national democratic framework. 
PK enjoys solid support in many campuses and is likely to 
gain votes in 2004 while remaining relatively small. 
Campaigning for Syariah law by the new Muslim groups 
is not likely to affect the results of the elections, though it is 
gaining in popularity in West Java, Madura and South 
Sulawesi. 
Infiltration by the army 
As in some other Muslim countries, Indonesia has devel-
oped the tradition of a secular administration. Somewhat 
like Turkey, the Indonesian armed forces developed a secu-
lar, anti-Muslim tradition. In the early years of the republic, 
the Indonesian army frequently fought against rebel groups 
wanting to establish a Muslim state. Already in those days, 
military intelligence developed a habit of infiltrating 
Muslim groups and inciting them to get involved in danger-
ous activities, which were then crushed. Top army intelli-
gence officers like Ali Murtopo and Benny Murdani 
became notorious for such intelligence operations, resulting 
in brutality towards Muslim radicals. 
This tradition of financing, fostering and infiltration 
continues to this day, especially in the two best known mili-
tia groups, Laskar Jihad and Front Pembela Islam (FPI). 
Against this background, it is not difficult to conclude that 
there are connections between the Bali blast perpetrators 
acy by al-Qaeda but is to do with domestic poli-
tics, especially this military group which has a 
long experience in black operations', he said 
'Terrorists in the case of Indonesia can be found 
within the state apparatus' . 6 Many political 
analysts in Indonesia also think along these lines. 
The Bali blast on 12 October accelerated 
measures by the authorities. Abu Bakar Ba'asyir 
who has been taken ill, was removed from hospi-
tal the day after the blast and taken into custody. 
Within a week the Megawati cabinet approved a 
new anti-terrorist decree giving greater leeway to 
arrest suspects and an enhanced role for military 
intelligence . 
The authorities had already started clamping down 
on radical Muslim groups prior to the Bali blast, 
targeting in particular Laskar Jihad and FPL 
Although the leaders of these organisations had 
strong ties with some highly-placed army and 
police officers, their military backers suddenly decided to pull 
the plug. Jafar Umar Thalib (Laskar Jihad) and Habib Rizieq 
(FP I) were both arrested just prior to the Bali blast. 
This is believed to have been prompted by a decision of the 
TNI Commander-in-Chief General Endriartono Sutarto to 
summon 'rogue' elements in the army, threatening to take 
harsh action if they continued to support these organisa-
tions. As a result,. Laskar Jihad announced its dissolution a 
few days before the Bali blast and the FPI froze its activi-
ties shortly after the blast. The two organisations crumbled 
within days. 
The recent bombings 
Most recent blasts have been politically motivated. The 
blasts during the short presidency of Abdurrahman Wahid 
(Gus Dur), who was trying to curb the political muscle of 
the army, were widely regarded as being aimed at under-
mining his presidency. 
An analysis by Kontras, a leading human rights organisa-
tion, concluded that none of the investigations or trials have 
been satisfactory as none looked at the motivation and none 
of the masterminds have been caught. 
From 1976 till 1997, with Suharto in power, there were 
hardly any terrorist attacks but from 1998, when he was 
forced to step down, the attacks increased dramatically. In 
1998 and 1999 13 attacks occurred, in 2000 there were 32, 
and from January till July 2001, there were 81, not including 
bombing incidents in conflict areas like Aceh, West Papua, 
Maluku and Poso. Some of the perpetrators have been identi-
fied, arrested and tried but the evidence has been far from 
convincing. There was plenty of evidence about the use of 
military equipment but military involvement has not been 
investigated. Many recent incidents prior to the Bali blast 
showed signs of greater professionalism as well as indications 
that the perpetrators were linked to the Bali tragedy. 
On 1August2000, a huge blast shook the residence of the 
Philippines ambassador in Jakarta. The 20kg TNT bomb 
had been planted in a red Suzuki van parked close to the 
residence and caused huge material damage. Buildings and 
6 TAPOL Bulletin No. 169/170, January/February 2003 
CHANGES IN THE MILITARY 
There have been some significant changes within the mili-
tary leadership. After the fall of Suharto, things changed 
drastically for the armed forces, the main feature being that 
they lost much of their political clout. While the moderate 
wings accepted the new paradigms the hard-liners thought 
otherwise. 
The political landscape of Indonesia during the last five 
years is largely the result of this ongoing struggle. It reflects 
on the one hand the inability of the moderates (and also the 
government) to create political stability and a sense of secu-
rity among its citizens. The hard-liners in the military are 
responsible for creating this instability. 
Dividing up the military into mainstream and hard-line 
wings is arbitrary and is of limited value. The mainstream 
wing comprises those anxious to focus on maintaining law 
and order and can be called the 'law and order' wing. On 
other issues like national security and dealing with 'sepa-
ratism' in Aceh and West Papua, the 'law and order' wing is 
as unbending as other TNI officers. TNI officers are also 
agreed on the issue of impunity. Despite serious efforts by 
the human rights community, so far no senior officers have 
been convicted; in some cases (see separate article), they 
have been acquitted. On such issues as raising extra funds, 
the divisions are deep and frequently lead to fights between 
the security forces. 
The TNI chain of command has not been very effective; 
more often than not, orders from the top are sabotaged at 
lower levels. This has an impact everywhere but especially 
in places of conflict like Maluku where religious conflict 
has flared for the last three years. The situation there got out 
of hand because sections of the security apparatus, both 
military and police, took sides in the feud. In the se~ond 
year of the conflict, hundreds of armed Laskar Jihad 
activists from different parts of Indonesia went to Maluku 
unhindered (or even protected) by sections of the military. 
Extreme Muslim militia groups like Laskar Jihad and FPI 
were encouraged by hard-line military commanders and 
have been allowed to parade in the big cities and even in 
front of the palace armed with swords and machetes. FPI 
units have attacked night clubs, massage parlours and other 
places they regard as unsavoury. Such activities have not 
been halted and even have the tacit support of the security 
forces. 
Gradually the 'law and order' wing under Commander-in-
Chief General Endriartono Sutarto has been able to restore 
the balance in his favour, not least because of the many 
atrocities involving Kopassus, the elite corps of the army. 
Kopassus officers have been charged for the murder of 
Theys Eluay, and are seen by the police as being respon~i­
ble for the killing of teachers in Timika. Their role over the 
years in the conflict in Maluku is legendary. 
ANTI TERRORISM 
homes and more than two dozen cars within a radius of 300 
metres were badly destroyed. Three bystanders were killed 
and 22 seriously wounded, including the ambassador who 
has been crippled for life. A group called Mujahidin 
Khandag claimed responsibility but nothing is known a?out 
it. During the interrogation of Bali suspects, connect10ns 
were made between the two incidents. 
On 13 September 2000 the high-rise building where the 
Jakarta Stock Exchange is located was badly damaged by a 
huge bomb which exploded in the car park; Fifteen people 
were killed and 34 seriously wounded. The attack was very 
professional; the choice of target ensured maximum public-
ity and it was timed to hit when transactions a~ the stoc.k 
exchange were at their busiest. The RDX explosive used is 
known to be used by the military. A number of men have 
been convicted,. including three NCOs from the army's elite 
corps: Corporal Ibrahim Hasan from Kostrad and Sergeant 
Irwan Ibrahim from Kopassus were given life sentences, but 
Sergeant Ibrahim Abdul Manaf Wahab escaped from prison 
in February 2001and is still at large. Two civilians w~re 
given 20-year sentences. The trials failed to reveal anythmg 
about the masterminds. 
On Christmas Eve 2000 a series of explosions occurred 
almost simultaneously in 38 places; mostly churches in 
Jakarta, Bandung, Mojokerto, Medan, Batam, Pakanbaru, 
Sukabumi, Mataram and Pematang Siantar. Nineteen people 
were killed and 120 were seriously wounded. The Christmas 
attacks were clearly the work of a professional group. Most 
of the bombs contained TNT though some were home-made 
bombs using a mixture of chemicals. Military involvement 
is widely suspected because of the meticulous planning of 
an operation in many parts of the country. In Medan and 
Bandung connections were traced back to senior military 
officers but the investigation was shelved. 
There have been few arrests and convictions. But links are 
being made following the Bali arrests. One suspect who has 
been eager to talk is Faiz bin Abu Bakar Bafana, who is being 
held in Singapore. He made many allegations about the 
involvement of Jema'ah Jslamiyah in the church bombings 
giving names of people being held in Indonesia. Bafana also 
mentioned Imam Samudra as being connected with the blast 
at the Atrium shopping centre in Jakarta on 1 August 2001. 
His confessions may not carry much weight however as he is 
detained under ISA, had no access to a lawyer and probably 
made his confessions under duress. ISA detainees can be 
held indefinitely without trial. He incriminated Abubakar 
Ba'asyir, alleging that he took part in meetings in Solo at 
which forthcoming terrorist actions were discussed. 
One name frequently mentioned is Hambali who is now 
Indonesia's most wanted man in connection with the Bali 
blast. Intelligence circles suspect that he has left the coun-
try and is hiding in Pakistan or Afghanistan. 
International or homegrown? 
Since the arrest of Amrozi, Imam Samudra aka Abdul Aziz 
and Muchlas aka Ali Gufron, journalists have tried to piece 
together information from police reports. They suggest that 
a complex network of persons and cells was involved in 
preparing and carrying out the Legian bomb attack. 
At least nine groups have been mentioned as being involved: 
the Serang Group (13 people), the Abdul Rauf group (4 
people) and the Sukoharjo group (2 people) involved in the 
preparations: lodging, finances and survey. The Lamongan 
group (11 people) and the Bali group (4 people) were directly 
involved in the blast. The Solo group (9 persons) handled the 
aftermath, finding hiding places and so on. Groups in Riau 
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and Menado were indirectly involved in the preparations. 
But the 'big fish' are said to be Imam Samudra and 
Muchlas. According to claims in the international press 
quoting from intelligence circles, Muchlas is alleged to be 
operational chief for the regional Jema'ah lslamiyah, 
replacing Hambali aka Riduan Isamuddin. Muchlas is also 
wanted in Singapore for his alleged role in a plot to blow up 
the US embassy in Singapore. 
The 'war against terrorism' has prompted the authorities to 
trample upon civil rights. The radical preacher Abubakar 
Ba'asyir is widely spoken of as the spiritual leader of 
Jema'ah Islamiyah and his contacts and pupils are alleged to 
be involved in the Al-Qaeda terrorist network. 
Testimony by 'key witnesses' said to provide irrefutable 
proof of terrorist connections has turned out to be very 
contentious. Confessions by Omar al-Faruq, an alleged Al-
Qaeda, operative were reported in Time magazine. This 
man was kidnapped by the Indonesian intelligence agency 
BIN in June 2002 and handed over to the CIA in violation 
of correct procedures. According to his so-called confession 
under interrogation in Afghanistan, he admitted to being 
involved in several bombing incidents in Indonesia in 1999 
and 2000 and in a plot to assassinate President Megawati. 
He mentioned many names, including Abubakar Ba'asyir, 
whom he described as being part of a terrorist ring. 
In January 2002, Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi, was arrested 
in the Philippines, caught red handed with a huge quantity 
of chemicals. As a former pupil of Abubakar Ba'asyir, he 
spoke about his involvement in several bombing acts, 
mostly in the Philippines. 
Two papers published by the Jakarta chapter of the 
International Crisis Group, headed by Sidney Jones focus 
on the domestic and international connections of Al-Qaeda 
in Southeast Asia and Jema'ah lslamiyah. Although the 
papers appear to be well researched and go into great detail 
about the organisational and personal connections between 
radical figures and groups in the Indonesian Muslim world, 
they fail to draw a distinction between radical right-wing 
~xponents and organised terrorists groups. Some of the 
information, presented in the studies as facts, is less than 
convincing and would not stand scrutiny in a court of law. 7 
Confusion about confessions 
Less than three weeks after the blast, the Indonesians 
already appeared with their first suspect. It did not take long 
before the three key suspects, Arnrozi, Imam Samudra and 
Muchlas admitted their role in the Bali bombing. In a sensa-
tional public appearance, Police Chief General Da'i 
Bachtiar appeared with Arnrozi in front of TV cameras ahd 
radio reporters. The aim of the exercise was clear, to 
convince a sceptical world that police investigations have 
produced swift results. In January two other key suspects 
were arrested in Kalimantan: Ali Irnron and Mubarak, 
bringing up to 17 the people who have been arrested in 
connection with the Bali blast. 
Arnrozi will be the first one to appear in court. The police 
forwarded 1600-page dossier to the prosecutors in mid 
January and it is expected that his trial will start in February, 
provided that the prosecutors do not find fault with the 
police dossier. 
Initially, people were impressed by the swift results and 
the seeming professionalism of the police officers, assisted 
by colleagues from Australia, the US, the UK and Japan. 
But gradually, fundamental flaws have begun to emerge. 
The first relates to the material used for the bombs and the 
remnants of the Mitsubishi van, containing the bomb which 
was allegedly driven to the site by Arnrozi. The huge crater, 
five-foot deep and twenty-foot wide indicates that the van 
would have been completely vaporised. In turns out the 
engine block was still intact and the police investigators were 
able to trace the owner of the van from reading van chassis 
number. This is what led to Arnrozi's arrest. In his testimony 
Arnrozi admitted carrying a huge amount of chemicals in his 
van to the site. In a later finding, the police traced 1 ton of 
explosives, owned by Arnrozi, in Lamongan, creating confu-
sion over whether the bomb had indeed been inside the van. 
Robert Finnegan, an investigative journalist and editor of 
Jakarta Post raises a key question: 
'Day after day investigators trotted out a different explo-
sives and combinations of explosives purportedly responsi-
ble for the blasts. In addition to C-4 and RDX there was 
now TNT, Ammonium Nitrate, HMX, Semtex, PETN, 
Chlorate and Napalm. Everything but the kitchen sink. Was 
this gross ineptitude? Or another ploy to throw independent 
investigators off the trail?' 8 
Things became even more confused when the key suspect, 
Imam Samudra, who claimed that he was behind the idea of 
the Bali blast, is now giving a very different version. 
According to this version, Iqbal, who supposedly died in the 
event, was a suicide bomber who carried one kg of TNT and 
exploded the bomb inside the cafe. Imam Samudra claims 
that he drove Iqbal to the site b~ motorbike. He says he 
shocked by the scale of the blast. 
Well he might be, for such an amount of explosives could 
not have caused such a blast. 
The testimonies regarding the preparation of the Bali blast 
also don't add up. According to the police the different 
groups met twice in Solo in different locations. In one of the 
locations the police found interesting documents about the 
organisational structure and strategy of Jema'ah Islamiyah, 
which is said to the first hard evidence about the existence 
of JI. 
As the story unravels, the evidence becomes ever more 
curious, but what is missing is any evidence of the military's 
role. As long as a tight veil of secrecy hides this part of the 
story, the real truth about the Bali outrage will remain 
hidden. * 
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Anti-terrorism decree threatens basic rights 
An anti-terrorism decree issued by President Megawati Sukarnoputri on 18 October, in the wake 
of the Bali bombing atrocity, represents a grave threat to civil rights and could lead to a return to 
the authoritarianism of the Suharto era, say Indonesian lawyers and human rights activists. They 
are concerned that the objectives of bringing the Bali bombers to justice and preventing future 
such outrages will be pursued at the expense of fundamental rights and freedoms. 
The decree - known as Perpu (Government Decree in 
Lieu of Law) No. 1 of 2002 - gives the authorities the power 
to detain individuals for up to six months without trial and, 
while it makes no reference to the Indonesian armed forces, 
TNI, it opens the way for the TNI to play a decisive role in 
identifying individuals to be targeted. Intelligence reports -
produced by agencies run by the armed forces and police -
may be used to initiate investigations which could lead to 
the arbitrary arrest and detention of a wide range of people, 
even though no material evidence against them is available. 
Terrorism is defined in such a way as to include ordinary 
crimes committed during legitimate political activities and 
activists in Aceh and West Papua are especially fearful that 
the decree will be used against them. 
Although the decree may not be as draconian as equiva-
lent measures in other countries - such as the Internal 
Security Acts in Malaysia and Singapore - the danger lies in 
the fact that it will be implemented in a country in which the 
military retains significant power and the corrupt legal 
system fails to protect individual rights. 
There is concern that the renewed emphasis on internal 
security will lead to the neglect of pressing issues, such as 
military and judicial reform, and allow the security forces to 
reinforce their power and influence. 
Moreover, it is likely to divert attention from 
widespread and systematic acts of state terror, 
which in the past several decades have 
claimed thousands of times more victims than 
the Bali bomb. 
Impunity for state terror is the 
norm 
The extent to which Indonesia's anti-terror-
ism measures represent a major threat to 
human rights was made clear in a Jakarta Post 
editorial published on international human 
rights day, 10 December: 
'In launching its campaign against terror after 
the Bali tragedy, the government of President 
Megawati Sukarnoputri has not only relegated 
human rights from the national agenda, but it 
may even have forsaken human rights princi-
ples. 
'All the evidence throughout the year suggests 
that as a national political agenda, human rights 
have not only been put on the back burner, but we 
seem to have even abandoned all earlier efforts at setting 
our human rights record straight.' 
In this situation, impunity remains the norm, with 
inevitable consequences for human rights, says the newspa-
per: 
'Impunity, in short, is still the rule in Indonesia. And 
because people rarely get punished, they will not hesitate to 
do the same thing again, and what is more, other people will 
be encouraged to take the same path. As long as impunity 
remains the norm, we can expect human rights violations to 
escalate in the coming years.' 
It goes on to point out that: 
'External pressures on the government to set Indonesia's 
human rights record straight have also ebbed this year, with 
counter-terrorism now taking center stage in international 
diplomacy.' 
Indonesia joins the 'war on terror' 
The decision to issue the anti-terror decree means that 
Indonesia has agreed to join the Bush administration's 'war 
on terror'. 
The decree was issued in great haste by the Megawati 
administration in response to the Bali atrocity. A second 
decree - Perpu No. 2 of 2002 - was issued at the same time 
to provide for the specific implementation of the first decree 
in relation to the crimes committed in Bali. 
Parliament, the DPR, had previously failed to agree to an 
Anti-PERPU demonstration 
anti-terrorism bill after months of controversy among MPs 
and vigorous protests from human rights activists. The Bali 
atrocity was used by the Executive as a reason to override 
Parliament although two new bills with similar provisions 
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are now being considered by Parliament. They will eventu-
ally replace the two decrees. 
President Megawati has also issued two Presidential 
Instructions (Inpres ). The first is directed at coordinating 
minister for political and security Affairs, General (retired) 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and gives him the powers to 
set up a mechanism for implementing the decree. It is not 
yet clear how he will exercise this power, but he is known 
to be cautious about setting up a body reminiscent of 
Kopkamtib, Suharto's feared special command for the 
restoration of security and order or its successor, 
Bakorstanas, which held a grip on political life in Indonesia 
for the thirty-three years of Suharto's New Order regime. 
The second Inpres is directed at the head of the state intel-
ligence agency, Badan Inteligen Negara (BIN), Lt-General 
(retired) Hendropriyono, and gives him the power to co-
ordinate all intelligence activities. This is the most worry-
ing aspect of the new measures, as will be explained. 
Terrorism broadly defined 
The presidential decree defines terrorists primarily in 
Article 6 as 'Persons who deliberately use violence or the 
threat of violence to create an atmosphere of terror or spread 
fear among the general public or create victims on a mass 
scale by depriving persons of their liberty or their life, or 
inflict damage or destruction on strategic, vital objects or 
the living environment or public facilities or international 
facilities .' 
The maximum punishments are death or life imprison-
ment. While the Decree then goes on to identify a whole 
range of acts of terrorism such as plane-hijacks and other 
threats to aircraft, the import of explosives, nuclear 
weapons and weapons of mass destruction, the broad defin-
ition stipulated at the outset encompasses ordinary crimes, 
such as criminal damage or common assault, which might 
occur during legitimate political actions such as protests 
outside mines and energy projects. 
Armed security for 'vital projects' 
By virtue of their status as 'vital projects', major enter-
prises are routinely given special protection by members o~ 
the armed forces. Within twenty-four hours of the Bah 
bomb, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono announced that armed 
forces protection of energy and mining operations would be 
stepped up. 
The major enterprises in this cat~gory include the US 
corporations, Exxon in Aceh, which mines and exports 
liquified natural gas (LNG), and Freeport in West Papua, 
the world's largest copper-and-gold mine. It is precisely in 
the vicinity of these enterprises that some of the worst 
human rights violations have occurred because of the pres-
ence of the military. British Petroleum is currently in the 
process of establishing a major LNG project in West Papua 
where similar abuses may occur. 
Enhanced role for intelligence agencies 
The decree specifically provides that 'intelligence reports' 
may be used to initiate a formal investigation. According to 
Munir, one of Indonesia's foremost human rights lawyers, 
this gives intelligence agencies the power to instigate the 
arrest of any suspect on the basis of preliminary evidence, 
which would normally be insufficient for charges to be 
brought. It may amount to no more than a mere suspicion 
that a person is involved in terrorism. 
The State Intelligence Agency, BIN, is headed by retired 
Lieutenant-General Hendropriyono, who is himself impli-
cated in a grave atrocity against Mu~l~m ~oups in Lamp~g 
in 1987. This highly dangerous prov1s10~ m the J?~cree g1v~s 
BIN and the military a direct and possibly dec1S1ve ro~e m 
identifying suspects and ensurin~ their arrest a~d detent10n. 
The decision on whether there 1s adequate evidence for an 
investigation to proceed is made by a di~trict court in closed 
session (Article 26). This removes an 1mport~nt sa~egu~rd 
for suspects, namely the public scrutiny of the mvest1gat10n 
process. It is especially disturbing given. the power ?f the 
investigator to detain a suspect for up to six months without 
charge or trial (Article 25). Few people expe~t the c~rrupt 
judiciary to provide effective protection agamst arbitrary 
detention. 
Security overrides rights and ref ~r~s 
Investigators who have been granted pe~ission by a 
district court to proceed are given powers to mter~ept. and 
confiscate the suspect's mail and other com~umcat1~ns, 
and may tap his or her phone so as to momtor possible 
preparations for an act of terrorism, for a period of up to one 
year (Article 31, Para 2). 
These are worrying departures from the procedures under 
Indonesia's Criminal Procedure Code, known as KUHAP. 
The Minister of Justice and Human Rights, Yusril Ihza 
Mahendra, who, with Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, had.the 
task of drafting the decree, argued in the press at the tI~e 
that KUHAP is inadequate for the purposes of fightmg 
terrorism, but many of Indonesia's leading human rights 
lawyers have said there was no need for a special decree. 
According to them, KUHP, Indonesia's Penal Code ~nd 
other legislation on explosives and money laundenng 
would, with a few necessary amendments, have been suffi-
cient to deal with terrorist crimes. 
The anti-terrorism decree means that Indonesia is now 
pursuing the security approach which was the hallma~k. of 
the New Order regime under General Suharto, givmg 
primacy to a wide range of security measures against so-
called acts of terrorism while ignoring the pressing need for 
reform in many areas of government. 
It would be more appropriate for the authorities to take 
steps to establish a properly functioning legal system capa-
ble of upholding the rule of law and protecting human 
rights. The Indonesian justice system is riven by corrup-
tion, institutional weaknesses and a lack of protection for 
individual rights and was described by the UN special 
rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, 
during a visit to Indonesia in July last year, as one of the 
worst he had seen. 
The decree's inclusion of the death penalty and its retro-
spective provisions are violations of the fundamental right 
to life and the right not to be tried and punished for an act 
which was not a crime at the time it was committed. These 
rights are supposed to be protected by the Indonesian 
Constitution. 
TAPOL believes that the decree is a serious setback for 
human rights in Indonesia. Terrorism is clearly a grave 
threat to life and limb for all citizens, Indonesian as well as 
foreign, but TAPOL believes that this can only be effec-
tively dealt with by root and branch reforms of the judiciary 
and the military. The Indonesian government should not 
allow the Washington sponsored 'war on terror' to force it to 
compromise Indonesia's faltering advance towards democ-
racy and the rule of law. * 
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Tanjung Priok massacre: will justice be done? 
On 12September1984, troops opened fire on a huge crowd of protesters in Tanjung Priok, 
Jakarta's dockland, killing hundreds of people. This atrocity is one of many perpetrated 
during the Suharto years which are still awaiting justice. Fourteen soldiers are due to go on 
trial in February but the generals who were responsible/or this crime against humanity are 
not among them. 
The Tanjung Priok massacre occurred at a time when the 
Suharto government was pushing for all parties and mass 
organisations including those based on religious principles 
to adopt Pancasila as their 'sole ideology'. This met with 
strong resistance in Muslim circles. The massacre occurred 
as part of a provocation to warn Muslims that opposition to 
this new law would have dire consequences. 
Prior to the massacre, several soldiers entered the dock-
lands mosque and tore down notices on the walls, provok-
ing angry responses; four mosque officials were taken into 
custody. The shooting took place when an estimated one 
thousand five hundred people marched to the local police 
command, demanding the men's release . They were 
confronted by heavily armed soldiers who opened fire 
indiscriminately. Hundreds of people were killed. Local 
people say that .;;;;;;;;;;;· ............. ;i""""l.....-----
seven hundred 
died. The streets 
were covered in 
blood but within 
hours, all traces 
of the massacre 
had been washed 
away and the 
bodies had been 
carried off in 
army trucks for 
burial in 
unknown parts. 
On the follow-
ing day, armed 
forces comman-
der, General 
Benny Murdani, 
and the Jakarta military commander, Major-General Try 
Sutrisno, visited the scene and announced that nine people 
had been killed and fifty-three injured. They alleged that the 
troops had no option but to open fire after an angry crowd 
'armed with knives, sickles, crowbars and fuel' mobbed the 
police station. Their account was hotly disputed by witnesses 
of the massacre but the tightly controlled press only reported 
what the generals had alleged. 
Ad hoc human rights court 
Since the fall of the Indonesian dictator in May 1998, a 
powerful campaign has been waged by survivors and rela-
tives of the victims to bring those responsible to justice. 
In June last year, when President Megawati announced the 
formation of an ad hoc court for East Timor, she also 
announced the creation of an ad hoc court to deal with the 
Tanjung Priok massacre, under the terms of a law adopted in 
2000 providing for special courts to be set up to handle past 
crimes against humanity and grave human rights abuses . 
After years of controversy over the inadequacies of the 
investigation into the massacre undertaken by Komnas 
HAM, the National Human Rights Commission, it has now 
been announced that fourteen military officers will go on 
trial in January or February. They include three major 
generals, one of whom is Major-General Sriyanto who is 
now commander of the army's elite corps, Kopassus. 
However, at the time of the massacre, 18 years ago, they 
were low-ranking officers commanding the operation in the 
field, acting on orders from their superiors. Sriyanto was 
head of the operations section of the North Jakarta military 
command (kodim) and would certainly have been under 
orders from his superiors at the Jakarta military command 
(kodam) The Komnas HAM investigation which became 
the basis for examination of the case by the Attorney 
General's Office listed the names of 23 persons to be 
considered as suspects but nine have now been excluded 
from the list of men to be indicted. 
The two generals who were responsible for the massacre 
were General Benny Murdani who was commander-in-
chief of the armed forces and of the special security agency, 
Kopkamtib, and Major-General Try Sutrisno, then 
commander of the Jakarta military command. Try Sutrisno 
later served as vice-president of Indonesia. In an attempt to 
evade justice, he has been in negotiation with some of the 
survivors to enter into an is/ah, an act of reconciliation and 
forgiveness. However, such a deal cannot under law replace 
a judicial process. 
Distorted justice 
One of Indonesia's foremost human rights lawyers, Munir 
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SH, the founder of Kontras, the Commission for the 
Disappeared and Victims of Violence, believes that in the 
preparatory stages, the case was reduced to a personal 
matter between the perpetrators and the victims, although 
the massacre had a profound impact on society at the time. 
Kontras has been acting as legal adviser of the victims and 
will represent them in court. 'From the way the case has 
been handled up to now by the Attorney General's Office, 
there is every reason to believe that the trial will be nothing 
less than a distortion of justice,' he told the press. 
He said he believed that pressure had been brought to 
bear on the Attorney General by military circles over the 
selection of the men to be put on trial, focusing only on offi-
cers in the field. He also lambasted the Kornnas HAM for 
initially producing an investigation report that placed the 
blame for the massacre on the victims. It was only after the 
findings were heavily criticised that the report was revised. 
According to Kontras, which has worked closely for years 
with the victims, the number of persons, all military or 
police, who should be held responsible for the Tar:jung 
Priok massacre is thirty-six, not the fourteen who will be 
charged before the ad hoc court. It should include Suharto 
who was the president and supreme commander of the 
Indonesian armed forces, and who, according to Kontras, 
masterminded the massacre. 
The attorney general's office announced on 14 January 
2003 that the Tanjung Priok trial would commence some 
time in February. The team of prosecutors will consist of 16 
persons, including four military prosecutors ( oditeur). 
Kontras complained bitterly in a statement that the prosecu-
tion team would fail to represent the interests of the victims. 
It feared that the abysmal performance of the prosecutors in 
the East Timor ad hoc trials would be replicated. * 
Indonesia: Muslims On Trial, published by TAPOL in 1987 
gives a comprehensive analysis of the Tanjung Priok 
Massacre, and the scores of trials that followed in its wake. 
The book has been translated into Bahasa Indonesia which 
has been published in two editions. The latest version: Islam 
Diadili : Mengungkap Tragedi Tanjung Priok was 
published in September 2002 by Teplok Press, Jakarta 
continued from page 21 
Military Law of the University of Mel?ou:ne and the East 
Timorese NGO, Judicial System Momtonng Progra~~e. 
The event, which reviewed past efforts and future p~ss1bil­
ities for accountability, was attended by repr~sentatn:es of 
the East Timorese government, the Serious Cr~mes Umt, the 
East Timorese judiciary, and representatl~es of _East 
Timorese and Indonesian civil society and mternatlonal 
NGOs. 
Participants agreed that the Jakarta trials were a trave_sty 
of justice. It was suggested that one step towards g~ne~atlng 
support in the UN Security Council for an alte~at1ve mter-
national judicial mechanism would be to obtam a 'seal of 
disapproval' of the trials from UN Secreta~ qeneral Kofi 
Annan, who is required to keep the Council_ mformed _of 
progress. This could be done by persu.ading him to appomt 
a team of legal experts to assess the trials. . . 
There was substantial agreement that the senous cnmes 
process in East Timor was an impo~ant part of the search 
for justice and that as much as possible should be done to 
get the most out of the process. It was generally felt_ that the 
East Timorese government needs to be open about its plans 
for the process, which must not be adversely affected by the 
withdrawal of the UN. 
Consideration was given to the merits of a procedure 
created by the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Yugoslavia - the 'Rule 61' procedure - which wou~d allo"." a 
panel of judges to confirm an indictment at a pub~1c heanng 
in the absence of the accused. The prosecution would 
present evidence to enable the judges to confirm the 
charges, but the procedure would not amount to a trial 'in 
absentia' and would not prejudice the accused's right to a 
fair trial. 
This public procedure would be a s~mrce of p~e~~u.re o!l 
the international community to fulfil its respons1b1ht1es, 1t 
would expose Indonesia's lack of co-operation and it would 
allow the victims to see that something was being done to 
bring high level Indonesian suspects to justice. Its intro-
duction would require new East Timorese legislation to 
supplement the current rules on criminal procedure. 
A number of NGOs, including TAPOL, agreed to 
continue the dialogue started by the symposium and to form 
an international coalition in support of an international 
tribunal for East Timor. A statement setting out the coali-
tion's aims and objectives will be issued shortly. The coali-
tion will be involved in several initiatives at the time of the 
conclusion of the Jakarta trials, including lobbying Kofi 
Annan and the members of the UN Commission on Human 
Rights and lobbying members of East Timor's parliament to 
support a resolution calling for an international tribunal. 
Brig. General 
Timbul Silaen, 
East Timor Police 
Chief - acquitted of 
charges. 
continued on page 14 
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Fond farewell to a wonderful woman 
When I heard in August 2002 that Ibu Sulami had died, 
memories of this wonderful woman came flooding back. 
Sulami, known affectionately as Ibu (Mother) Sulami, was 
a woman who I had grown to admire and love as one of 
Indonesia's most committed fighters for women's rights and 
a fierce defender of the victims of the massacre conducted 
on the orders of General Suharto when he seized 
power from President Sukarno in 1965. It was she 
above all who was fired with a determination to do 
what she could to expose the massacres master-
minded by Suharto soon after he seized power 
from President Sukarno in October 1965. At least 
a million people met their deaths in horrific ways 
during the six months from October 1965. 
I first met Ibu Sulami when I entered Bukit 
Duri Prison in Jakarta in August 1970. My most 
vivid recollection of her in prison was that she 
lived a self-contained life in her cell and kept 
herself very well informed about the world 
outside. That was quite an achievement as we 
political prisoners were strictly prohibited from 
reading newspapers or listening to the radio. But 
Thu Sulami was not a person to allow these rules to 
cramp her style. She managed to keep herself 
supplied with newspapers and made it her task to 
keep the rest of us informed. Many years later, she 
told me that convicted women prisoners in the 
wing for criminal prisoners smuggled newspapers, 
pencil and paper to her in the evenings and took them 
back the following morning. 'That was how I kept my brain 
occupied,' she told me. What I didn't know then was that she 
wrote a novel, a novella, many short stories and poems 
during the twenty years she spent in prison. 
There was one occasion, I heard, when a sudden inspec-
tion of the cells compelled her to masticate and swallow a 
letter that she was in the middle of writing. 
Fighting for women's rights 
When Suharto took power in October 1965, Sulami was 
deputy secretary-general of the hugely popular women's 
organisation, Gerwani and was busily preparing for its fifth 
national congress later that year. Within days, she was 
forced to go underground and spent the next eighteen 
months building contacts with others who had escaped 
arrest and finding sanctuary with friends. until she was 
arrested in early 1967. 
She was born in Sragen, Central Java on 15 August 1926. 
After the proclamation of Indonesia's independence in 
August 1945, she became a member of Pemuda Putri 
Indonesia, the Young Women's Association. At the time of 
the second Dutch aggression in 1949, she joined a women's 
guerrilla unit and took part in a 'long march' from Luwu 
Mountain to Mranggen, Semarang. 
After life returned to normal in the new Indonesian state, 
she joined the left-wing women's organisation, Gerwis 
which changed its name to Gerwani in 1951 . In those days, 
it described itself as an organisation that was committed to 
'struggle and education'. In 1954, she was elected onto the 
East Java executive committee of the organisation and three 
years later, she became second deputy secretary-general and 
moved to Jakarta. She was for years a regular contributor to 
the organisation's publication. She also attended meetings 
of the Women's International Democratic Federation and 
threw herself with great enthusiasm into strengthening 
Gerwani's international ties. 
Although it had no formal ties with the Indonesian 
Communist Party, Gerwani was acknowledged as a close 
ally. So, when Suharto cracked down on the left, Gerwani 
was not only banned and its members hunted down and 
killed; it was also subjected to a vicious assault for allegedly 
having conducted acts of sexual depravity in Lubang Buaya 
where the bodies of the six murdered generals were taken on 
1 October. The demonisation of Gerwani played a major role 
in inciting the frenzied killings of 1965-1966. 
In February 1975, she was one of four leading women 
activists to go on trial, charged with having participated 
'directly or indirectly' in the October 1965 'coup', with 
trying to revive the banned Communist Party and engaging 
in illegal activities. Her co-defendants were Sudjinah, 
responsible for education and culture in Gerwani, Sri 
Ambar, head of the women's bureau of the banned trade 
union federation, SOBSI, and Suharti Harsono, a leader of 
the banned peasants' organisation, BTI. 
Because she was from Gerwani, Sulami was treated in 
court as the 'leading defendant'; she was sentenced to 
twenty years while her co-defendants received sentences of 
18 and 15 years. After the sentences were officially 
confirmed, the women were transferred to Tanggerang 
Prison in 1981 where she remained until her conditional 
release in 1984. For several years, she was required to 
report monthly to the public prosecutor's office and was 
employed by the mother of the prison director who ran a 
factory canteen nearby. 'At least I was safe there, ' she later 
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tol~ me, :as her husband was a member of the military 
police which gave me a kind of protection.' For many years, 
it was difficult for her to return home to Central Java 
because things were not easy for ex-political prisoners in 
the countryside. 
Exposing the 1965-66 massacre 
From the early days of her imprisonment, Sulami was 
obsessed with the idea of exposing the massacre that swept 
through Indonesia after Suharto came to power. Considering 
how that massacre has virtually fallen into obscurity among 
the m~ny horrific crimes against humanity perpetrated in the 
~entleth century, this is one aspect of her many contribu-
tions that should be carried forward, in her memory. 
Once she was free from the constraints of her conditional 
release, she started travelling to regions where the killings 
had been most intense, meeting survivors and relatives of the 
victims and collecting accounts of how people had been 
slaughtered. Her findings are reported in an interview 
published in TAPOL Bulletin (No 156) in early 2000. It was 
through the many contacts that she made with survivors that 
the idea was born of setting up an organisation, YPKP 
(Indonesian Institute for the Study of the 1965-1966 
Massacre) dedicated to investigating the 1965-1966 massacre 
and where possible exhuming the bodies of the victims and 
returning them to their families for proper burial. This ~ork 
exposed her and her colleagues to continual vilification and 
frequent physical abuse. Her humble home which became 
the organisation's central office in Tanggerang, a rather 
remote suburb of Jakarta, was poorly protected against hostile 
groups and on one occasion was the target of an arson attack. 
Her contribution to this movement has been the subject of 
several documentaries about the massacre. 
S~la~i was a woman of boundless energy and passionate 
de.dicat10n. Yet she was physically very frail and painfully 
thm. When I met her in Amsterdam in December 1999 to 
attend a seminar on Impunity, she was also there for a 
medical check-up. The last time we met was in Jakarta in 
late 2000. She has just suffered a severe stroke and when I 
visited her at her new home in Jakarta that she shared with 
h~r belov~d sister, she was bed-ridden and too ill to recog-
mse th~ friends gathered round her bedside. I really thought 
that this was the end for her, but she survived. 
Maybe it was her frailty that made it possible for others in 
the organisation to seize control and try to change the direc-
tion which she had spearheaded. Perhaps one of the lessons 
is that the great task of exposing the massacre is not one that 
should be left to the survivors and the relatives of the 
victims. The massacre is a matter for the entire Indonesian 
nation and only _when this is acknowledged will it be possi-
ble for Indonesia to deal with this historic, humanitarian 
tragedy and build sound foundations for a true democracy. 
Carmel Budiardjo 
continued from page 12 
A damaging precedent for Indonesia 
The failure of the ad hoc human rights court to dispense 
justice is a major blow for Indonesia as well as East Timor. 
It sends out a clear signal that those involved in serious 
crimes will not be punished. 
It is disturbing to note that the TNI commander, General 
Endriartono Sutarto, is already lobbying hard against trials 
for past abuses in Aceh on the erroneous basis that they 
would undermine the peace process there. The reality is 
that there can be no peace without justice. A Jakarta Post 
editorial on 16 December rightly pointed out that injustice 
was the prime cause of discontent among the people of 
Aceh and helped to bolster popular support for the Free 
Aceh Movement, GAM. 
Meanwhile, there is little sign of any meaningful progress 
towards the resolution of numerous cases in West Papua, 
most notably the killing of Papuan leader, Theys Eluay, in 
November 2001 and the killing of an Indonesian and two 
Americans near the Freeport mine in August 2002. The 
Indonesian military is strongly implicated in both cases. 
The outcomes of the East Timor trials do not augur well 
for the trials in the ad hoc court for the Tanjung Priok case 
due to start in the early part of 2003. The current head of 
the army's special forces, Kopassus, Major General 
S~iya~to and 13 other suspects will be charged with gross 
y10lations of human rights in relation to their alleged 
mvolvement in a massacre in which scores of people were 
killed or 'disappeared' when the security forces opened fire 
on Muslim demonstrators in 1984. (See separate article.) 
Without justice and adequate enforcement of the rule of 
law, the practice of impunity will continue and those 
involved in rights abuses, including veterans from East 
continued from page 26 
Timor, will expect to get 
away with their crimes 
however heinous. * 
Former Governor of East 
Timor, Abilio Soares - found 
guilty and sentenced to three 
years in jail. 
from Indonesian sub-contractors by 40 per cent during the 
year. 
F?llowing the closure of PT Doson, thousands of workers 
. ralhed to protest against the government's failure to compel 
the employer . to honour a ministerial decree obliging the 
company to give severance pay to their laid-off workers. 
Moreover, workers who lose their jobs do not enjoy 
unemployment benefits which exacerbates the level of 
?estitu~ioi:i in !hose parts of the country that have been 
~ndustnahsed smce the 1980s. According to workers sacked 
m Jak~rta, many were now reduced to eating nothing more 
than nee and salt and could no longer afford to pay their 
rents. 
There ~ave been numerous actions by workers across the 
coun~ m. recent months which we will report on compre-
hensively m our next issue. * 
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Foreign tourists sentenced for visa abuse 
Two women on a visit to South Aceh in September 2002 were apprehended by the security 
forces, taken to Banda Aceh after being manhandled and subjected to sexual harassment 
and later charged for violating the terms of their tourist visas. Their treatment and trial have 
been condemned as being politically motivated. 
The two women are Lesley McCulloch, an academic 
from Scotland who is well known for her wide-ranging 
research work on the Indonesian military and her many arti-
cles about the human rights situation in Aceh, and Joy Lee 
Sadler, a retired nurse from Iowa who was making her first 
visit to Aceh. 
They were accused of having violated the terms of their 
tourist visas by making contact with members of the Free 
Aceh Movement (GAM) and in Sadler's case, providing 
medical help to people in need. They strenuously denied the 
charges and claimed that they had encountered a group of 
armed men who compelled them to visit a GAM unit. 
Lesley McCulloch was sentenced to five months with 
deduction for the time already spent in police custody while 
Joy Sadler was sentenced to four months, also with deduc-
tion. They were due for release in early February and early 
January 2002 respectively. 
The arrest of the two women attracted much international 
attention, especially in Scotland, because of the strenuous 
efforts on behalf Lesley by her parents, Mattie and Donnie 
McCulloch, in the US, thanks to the campaigning by Joy 
Sadler's large family in Iowa and the Indonesia Human 
Rights Network in Washington, as well as in Australia, 
where Lesley McCulloch had just ended a one-year lecture-
ship at the University of Tasmania, and where academic 
colleagues campaigned vigorously on her behalf. 
The arrests and subsequent sentencing were clearly moti-
vated by a move by the security forces to warn foreigners 
against making what they consider to be visits to Aceh that 
could result in the dissemination of information about the 
Joy Sadler (left) and Lesley McCul/ouch in the prison cell 
human rights abuses that have been rampant there for more 
than a decade. It was also intended to 'punish' Lesley 
McCulloch who has published numerous articles and 
research papers exposing the extensive business interests 
and corruption of the Indonesian military and whose many 
articles on the human rights situation in Aceh have been 
published in The Jakarta Post as well as in a number of 
newspapers in South East Asia. 
Witnessing abuse at first hand 
After being held in South Aceh during which time they 
were subjected to physical assaults and sexual harassment 
when they resisted attempts to seized their possessions, the 
two women spent three months at the headquarters of the 
police in Banda Aceh where they were cooped up a small 
room with no chance to take physical exercise while scant 
attention was paid to their basic needs. They were repeat-
edly horrified to hear the screams of pain coming from 
Acehnese who were under interrogation by the police. 
Shortly after their ordeal began, Joy Sadler drew attention 
to her failing health because she has been diagnosed as HIV-
positive and in need of medication for her condition. But this 
made no difference to her treatment. Lesley complained 
throughout her detention of serious back problems because 
of the unsuitability of their sleeping conditions. 
When the judge announced in early December, at the third 
hearing of their trial, that the next hearing would be post-
poned for nearly three we~ks, Joy announced her intention 
to go on hunger strike, declaring that she had 'come to the 
end of her tether' . She spent the rest of her detention on 
nothing more than a few 
glasses of liquid each day. 
Although their lawyers made 
strenuous efforts to persuade 
the authorities to allow them 
to be held under house arrest, 
this was repeatedly refused 
'on security grounds'. 
After a court hearing on 23 
December, the judge ordered 
the two women to be trans-
ferred from the police 
command to the local 
women's prison. Here, they 
found themselves sharing a 
cell with two Acehnese 
women, one of whom was 
Reihan Diany who is facing 
charges after she led a 
demonstration by her 
women's organisation, 
ORPAD. She is being 
charged under the hate-
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spreading articles of the Criminal Code and could face a 
sentence of up to seven years for insulting the head of state. 
'Threat to national security' 
The charge sheet against Lesley McCulloch went far 
beyond the question of violating the terms of her tourist 
visa. She was accused of spying and of posing a 'threat to 
national security'. She was said to have illegally visited 
rebel held areas and accused of carrying 'sensitive docu-
ments' in violation of her visa. In her defence, she told the 
court that they had been accosted by a group of armed men 
who insisted on taking them to meet members of GAM, the 
Free Aceh Movement 
As Stephen Jacobi of Fair Trials Abroad said following the 
verdict, the women's treatment appeared from the outset to 
be suspicious. 'Normally, for visa offences, people are simply 
booted out of the country. It's got to be politically linked.' 
After the verdict was announced, McCulloch told the 
press: 'They wanted to make an example of us and to show 
foreigners that, if you violate your tourist visa, especially in 
places like Aceh, this is what can happen to you. For me, it 
was because of the work I had done in exposing military 
and police corruption.' 
She went on to accuse all those concerned in bringing the 
charges and passing sentence of 'being driven by hatred and 
fear and paranoia of my work.' She said that, throughout the 
whole process, there was pressure from the military. 'The 
judge was under pressure to make me pay for past misdeeds, 
and for exposing human rights abuses here in Aceh.' 
Because of all this,' she said, 'the local military hate me.' 
She described the court proceedings as 'flawed'. She said 
that no proof of the charges against her had been presented 
in court and no witnesses had been called. Although she was 
entitled, under Indonesian law, to appeal against the verdict, 
her lawyers later said that they had advised against this as it 
would only prolong the process because the justice system 
in Indonesia works very slowly. In the weeks before the 
trial, the prosecutor had tried to persuade her lawyers to 
provide financial inducements to speed up the legal process, 
a common practice in the Indonesian judiciary, but this they 
refused to do. 
As Lesley also explained in court, the documents she was 
accused of carrying had been sent to her by email and were 
found on her laptop. There was nothing secret about the 
maps she had which had already been made public. Asked 
whether she regretted having these documents and 
photographs in her possession, she said: 'Even if I hadn't 
had the maps and other documents. I think that the process 
and the outcome would have been exactly the same.' 
Although she foresaw that when, in future, she would 
apply for a visa to visit Indonesia, she might very well be 
refused, she said: 'I'm not worried about that. I'll be back.' 
Following the court's decision to sentence · Joy Sadler to 
four months which meant she would have to spend two 
more weeks in prison before being released, Lesley 
announced that she would go on hunger strike in protest 
against this decision. 
Declining health ignored 
Although it was clear that Joy Sadler's condition had dete-
riorated rapidly during the last weeks of her imprisonment, 
largely because of the difficulty in obtaining the medication 
she needed to treat her HIV-positive condition, virtually 
nothing was done by the authorities to ameliorate her 
circumstances or ensure that she received proper medical 
attention. 
One week before her release on 9 January, she had become 
so frail that she was taken out of prison by her lawyer and 
went in search of hospital treatment. However, none of the 
three hospitals she visited in Banda Aceh would agree to 
treat her. Her lawyers later circulated a letter that she wrote 
after this terrible experience. She said that the rejection by 
the three hospitals left her feeling ashamed, alone and help-
less. She said this was the first time she had felt ashamed 
since being diagnosed HIV-positive five years ago. 'I was at 
the mercy of the health care profession, but was shown no 
mercy. And I was too sick to use my own medical knowl-
edge to help myself. I felt so sick, I thought I would die.' 
She said that she realised that many Acehnese were 
infected with HIV but because of the stigma, the true 
number is not known. She said she would like to initiate an 
education program on HIV and related illnesses in Aceh . 'I 
will work toward this in the near future . The Indonesian 
government has paid lip service to HIV programmes, but 
from my experience here, I know that progress has been 
slow and meanwhile, people continue to die because of lack 
of heath care. This is unacceptable.' 
* 
Reihan Diany receives 6 month sentence 
A few days after the trials against Joy Sadler and Lesley 
McCulloch ended, another trial was held, this time against 
woman activist Reihan Diany. Reihan is chairperson of 
ORPAD (Organisasi Perempuan Aceh Demokratik, 
Acehnese Democratic Woman's Organisation). She was 
arrested on 13 July last year during a demo in Banda Aceh. 
The demo demanded the resignation of the Megawati 
government. The charges against her were insulting the 
head of state under articles 134 and 13 7 of the Criminal 
Code, which made her liable to a maximum sentence of 
six years. 
Reihan's defence team consisted of competent human 
rights lawyers, which included Nursyahbani 
Kacasungkana and Syarifah Murlina. In particular in the 
Netherlands, a campaign was launched for her release. 
The judges decided to give Reihan Diany a six month 
sentence, which she had already served. Reihan left the 
prison on 13 January. 
16 TAPOL Bulletin No. 169/170, January/February 2003 
I 
: MALUKU 
Kopassus and the Maluku crisis 
The involvement of security troops in fostering, training and financing the conflict in 
Maluku is a well known fact. But with the surrender to the Indonesian police of Berty 
Loupatty, the notorious leader of a Christian militia group, 'Gang Coker', more facts have 
come to light about the sinister role of Kopassus, the elite corps of the army. 
In late 2002, Idul Fitri, the festivities at the end of the 
Muslim fasting month, as well as the Christmas and New 
Year celebrations passed without any serious incidents in 
Maluku. In previous years, important religious celebrations 
were always the occasion for vicious attacks on churches or 
mosques. The hardliners on both sides deliberately chose 
holy days to create disturbances as a way of highlighting the 
animosity between the two communities. Things have 
changed for the better and proof that the religious conflict 
was largely stage-managed by sections of the military and 
their proxy militia groups is becoming clearer that ever. 
In January 2003 positive signs have emerged. When 
Indonesian cities were deluged by demonstrations protest-
ing against price hikes by the government, a new front, the 
unified student front, emerged in Ambon, consisting of 
Christian and Muslim students to demonstrate against hikes 
in the price of fuel and phones. As the feeling of war-weari-
ness has spread among the population, street markets have 
started to function again with Muslim and Christian traders 
setting up stalls side by side. But while this was happening 
in Ambon City, the capital, conditions in Central Maluku 
have not improved: the region is still segregated into 
The Coker Gang 
The Coker Gang is run by Berty Loupatty who has a long 
history of gangsterism in Jakarta and Surabaya. He 
managed to bring several gangs together, bearing highly 
colourful names like Papi Coret, the Sex Pistols and the 
Van Boomen Gang. When the Coker Gang decided to 
expand their operations to Ambon, he came into conflict 
with a local group headed by Agus Wattimena. 
In the early days of the conflictAgus established his own 
Christian militia named Laskar Kristus. In those days, 
Laskar Kristus was superior in th'e quantity and quality of 
its weaponry. It often happened that the two Christian mili-
tia gangs fought each other over control of the Christian 
community. In January 2001 a shoot-out occurred in 
Kudamati, the stronghold of the Coker gang. Two months 
later Agus was found dead in his house. According to one 
version, the security forces killed the gang leader but 
others say Berty Loupatty was responsible. 
The Coker gang began to play a major role in the Maluku 
conflict in 2001, with the arrival of Kopassus units. Berty 
Loupatty became a Kopassus informer and by August 
2001 his gang was involved up to the hilt in a number of 
bloody operations. 
Muslim and Christian quarters. 
In October the police issued an arrest warrant for members 
of a militia group, Gang Coker ( Cowok Keren, the 
Handsome Dudes), a vicious gang that has enjoyed the 
protection of Kopassus, the notorious red beret special 
corps of the army. 
A brief history 
The conflict in Maluku started in January 1999 following 
a trivial incident between two pedestrians, a Christian and a 
Muslim. Such a thing can happen anywhere but this inci-
dent triggered a prolonged, bloody conflict, now in its 
fourth year, which has developed all the features of a reli-
gious feud. At least 9,000 people have been killed and 
400,000 have become internally displaced as a result of this 
war.[see TAPOL Bulletin No. 168, September 2002, 
'Maluku is now a closed territory'.] 
From the outset the role of the military was the determin-
ing factor in escalating the conflict. As in East Timor, the 
military have utilised militia groups in a very effective way. 
These preman groups, as they are called in Indonesia, 
played a key role of escalating the conflict into a full blown 
religious feud. Several of the key Malukan preman gangs 
were originally based in Jakarta. The Muslim preman gangs 
were recruited as political thugs by General Wiranto, the 
most senior military officer in the second half of the 
nineties. The Christian preman gangs had a long tradition of 
being part of the Jakarta mafia, operating as security guards 
for illegal gambling dens, night clubs and brothels. From 
the start, the godfathers of the preman gangs were military 
officers. The gangs re-located to Maluku and helped to fuel 
the conflict. When the fighting escalated, both gangs 
recruited hot-headed youngsters from their communities 
and reciprocal attacks on villages started to happen. 
In the first stage of the conflict, the Muslim community 
suffered the greatest damage. Many were forced to flee and 
in particular three long-established communities, known as 
BBM (people originating from Buton, Bugis and Makassar) 
had to flee from Maluku becoming refugees in other islands. 
Retaliation was bound to happen. All over Indonesia appeals 
were made to help the suffering Muslims in Maluku. 
In February 2000 a horrific bloodbath occurred in Tobelo 
and Galela, in North Maluku. It is estimated that 1,500 
Muslims were butchered within a short space of time, which 
was possibly the highest death toll in a religious conflict in 
the history of Indonesia. Then, a hardline Malukan officer, 
Major General Suaidi Marassabessy, brought 800 Muslim 
soldiers from Sulawesi to wage attacks on Christian 
communities. By mid-2000 a new militia group appeared on 
the scene, Laskar Jihad, with recruits mostly from Javanese 
villages. Hundreds of Jihad warriors arrived in Ambon City, 
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shifting the balance of power in favour of the Muslim side. 
While all this was happening, the government in Jakarta 
sat idly by, watching on the sidelines. The conflict could 
only happen because of the consent and/or support of 
certain military wings. Laskar Jihad is a supreme example 
of hardl ine officers being the masters giving orders. Maluku 
increasingly descended into a war zone while measures 
taken by the government in Jakarta only strengthened the 
power base of the military. Maluku was given a second 
military command, with the 
province being split in two, 
Maluku and North Maluku 
and the whole area was placed 
under a civilian emergency. 
None of these measures 
contributed to improving 
security of the region. This 
situation did not last long 
because sections of the secu-
rity forces adopted partisan 
positions in the conflict. 
This was followed by a new 
phase with two military strate-
gies vying with each other. 
The hardliners insisted on 
continuing the conflict 
because this would ensure that 
the military remained at the 
heart of the conflict, while 
creating opportunities to enjoy 
the spoils of war like smug-
gling, illegal logging and 
extortion. By 2002 the situa-
tion had become increasingly 
) 
-----
chaotic. Police units were siding with the Christians and 
army units were. siding with the Muslims, with the marines 
trying to defend the beleaguered Christians. Lines of 
command no longer functioned and groups abroad adopted 
an attitude of resignation, feeling there was nothing useful 
they could do. 
The other military strategy is based in Jakarta where the 
armed forces leadership have been trying to restore law and 
order but without much success. In just three years, three 
military commanders were appointed in Maluku, further 
proof that the line of command wasn't working. Maluku was 
overwhelmed with military. At the height of the conflict 
9,000 military, 2,000 extra police and 500 marines were sent 
on top of the 15 battalions already in the region, but none of 
these efforts worked. Hostilities continued unabated and 
sections of the security forces continued to take sides. The 
present regional commander of the Pattimura military 
command which covers Maluku, Major General Djoko 
Santoso, was formerly commander of Kostrad's second divi-
sion, one of the army's foremost combat units. 
Then, Indonesia's best troops were sent in, a combination 
of Kopassus, marines and airforce commandos. This new 
force which is known as Yon Gab (Batalyon Gabungan, 
Joint Battalion) was formed to crack down on the Laskar 
Jihad forces. On two occasions, Yon Gab units viciously 
attacked two Muslim bastions, causing many casualties and 
extensive material damage. In the aftermath of those battles 
it became even clearer that scores of military were fighting 
alongside the Muslim combatants. But tt was also the first 
clear sign that law and order was gaining ground. 
Peace efforts 
At various levels civil society in Maluku, Indonesian 
NGOs and the authdrities tried to develop peace initiatives. 
With the best of intentions, none of these efforts bore much 
fruit because of the reality on the ground. The military ~nd 
the militia groups were running the show and fuellmg 
hostilities. Each time a peace initiative was taken, bloody 
incidents broke out. 
,.. / 
But gradually conditions began to change. Efforts by tradi-
tional leaders and civil society organisations in Southeast 
Maluku started to bear fruit. Life returned to normal and the 
communities started to function under de-segregated condi-
tions. In North Maluku hostilities also declined. Because of 
war-weariness, when incidents occurred, the targeted 
communities did not retaliate, realising that most of the 
incidents were stage-managed. 
In due course, a joint effort by sections of civil society in 
Maluku and Indonesian NGOs, called the Baku Bae initia-
tive, was taken, creating new openings. But the conditions 
were not yet conducive for establishing real reconciliation 
between the two sides. 
In February 2002 the government in Jakarta brokered an 
important peace agreement called Malino II. but the military 
and their proxies responded by trying to sabotage the accord. 
A new round of bloody incidents occurred resulting in more 
disillusionment among the population in Central Maluku. 
The authorities developed another strategy and began to 
round up the leaders of FKM (Front Kedaulatan Maluku, 
Maluku Sovereignty Front) and Laskar Jihad. The FKM 
had come into being early in the conflict and its leaders 
accused the authorities in Jakarta of carrying out a deliber-
ate policy of creating mayhem in Maluku. In the second 
stage FKM decided to pick up the banner of RMS (South 
Maluku Republic), the independence struggle launched in 
1950. The FKM as well as the RMS which still enjoys the 
support of the Malukan community in the Netherlands, are 
widely seen as Christian-based movements. FKM has no 
armed wing but is seen as a threat to Indonesia's territorial 
integrity. Several FKM leaders were arrested and charged 
18 TAPOL Bulletin No. 169/170, January/February 2003 
with flying the banned flag of the RMS on 25 April. 
The Laskar Jihad leader Jafar Umar Thalib was arrested 
at around the same time, accused of inciting violence and 
insulting the president. A few months later, on 7 October, 
the leaders of Laskar Jihad, decided to disband and halt its 
activities. About a thousand members left Maluku and 
returned to Java. 
In October the police in Ambon decided to round up the 
Coker Gang. In the first raid 13 people were arrested but 
some key members, especially Berty Loupatty, were 
beyond the reach of the police because they enjoyed the 
protection of Kopassus. In December Loupatty surrendered 
to the police in Central Java and was placed under the 
protection of Brimob, the elite corps of the police. The 
removal of the two main militia groups Laskar Jihad and 
Coker Gang, has created more favourable conditions for 
reconciliation. 
Unsavoury coalition 
Confessions by Berty Loupatty have confirmed that most 
of the incidents were stage-managed by the military to fuel 
the ongoing conflict and ferment an atmosphere of fear and 
suspicion. Tempo Magazine in Jakarta gained access to 
police reports, revealing that Coker was involved in at least 
13 incidents, 9 of which included members of Ko-
passus.[Tempo No. 46, 19 January 2003]. 
Christian Rahayaan, a lawyer for Coker. told the press: 
'During questioning, members of the Coker gang said 
Kopassus soldiers gave them directives, weapons and 
bombs to carry out every attack (in 2002). It's clear that the 
unrest in Maluku is the work of provocateurs. They use the 
pretext to create the impression that without the military, 
Maluku won't be safe'. [AFP, 8 January 2003]. 
According to police reports Coker was involved in the 
destruction of a public transport terminal on 27 August 
2001, killing 2 persons and wounding 16. A month later the 
Christian militia group placed a bomb in a minibus, killing 
one person. On 12 November 2001, supported by a 
Kopassus member called Ridwan, Coker members planted 
a bomb in an electronics shop killing 3 persons. Just before 
Christmas Day 2001 they exploded a bomb on a ferry carry-
ing hundreds of passengers, heading towards the Galala 
harbour in Ambon. The ferry sank, 4 people were killed and 
scores were wounded. The Kopassus member involved was 
known as Dio. 
Together with Kopassus troops, Coker launched attacks 
on the villages of Portho and Haria on 10 April and 8 May 
2002, with the intention of provoking the villagers to fight 
each other. 
The attack on Soya 
The most vicious combined operation of Coker and 
Kopassus was the attack on the village of Soya, located on 
the slopes of a mountain, on 28 April 2002. Logistically 
speaking, it would have been almost impossible for anyone 
without a professional background to launch an attack on 
Soya because of its location. The police report now explains 
what really happened. Ten members of Coker joined a force 
of 200 'phantom' troops in combat uniform and wearing 
masks. The attack happened at dawn using SS-1 machine 
guns and semi-automatic AK-47 rifles. Bombs and mortars 
were also used in the attack on defenceless villagers. A 
'scorched earth' tactic was used, 22 houses were destroyed 
by fire, as well as the historic church of Soya built during 
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Portuguese times and 12 people were killed. The Soya 
bloodbath created new tensions between Muslim and 
Christian communities. It is now clear that the attack was 
not the work of Muslim warriors as was thought at the time 
but an attack by a Christian militia gang together with 
Kopassus units. 
These revelations spread panic among senior Kopassus 
officers. The Kopassus commander in Maluku during 2002 
admitted that Berty Loupatty had been an informer but 
denied that his unit had trained and supported Coker. Then, 
the commander of Kopassus, Major-General Sriyanto 
Muntasram, sought to evade responsibility by claiming that 
Kopassus units based in Maluku were not under his 
command, but were the responsibility of the Pattimura mili-
tary command. Major General Sriyanto himself will shortly 
go on trial for his alleged his role in a bloodbath in 1984 in 
Tanjung Priok against Muslim demonstrators (see separate 
article) . 
Loupatty's lawyer Rahajaan is convinced that the 
Kopassus men involved in these bloody incidents were part 
of the force's command structure and not 'rogue' elements or 
deserters. Berty Loupatty enjoyed protection from a 
Kopassus unit under First Lieutenant Rory Sitorus. In 
October the police finally decided to round up members of 
the Coker Gang but were not able to arrest Loupatty 
because of the protection of Lt. Si torus. Even the support of 
Major General Djoko Santoso, the Pattimura military 
commander, did not help. But in December, Berty Loupatty, 
aware of the precariousness of his situation, leftAmbon and 
surrendered to the police in Solo, Central Java. 
It looks as if all the dirty tricks practised by Kopassus in 
East Timor for 25 years are being repeated in Maluku. * 
Demonstration in Jakarta. 
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No justice for East Timor 
A series of verdicts delivered recently by Indonesia's ad hoc human rights court for East Timor 
have provided a further damning indictment of the state of Indonesian justice and reinforced the 
widely-held view that Indonesia is not committed to providing meaningful justice for the victims of 
human rights atrocities in East Timor. 
· Eurico Guterres convicted 
On 27 November 2002, the ad hoc court found former 
militia leader Eurico Guterres guilty of crimes against 
humanity and sentenced him to ten years imprisonment. 
The court's decision to impose the first substantial sentence 
was encouraging, but ten years is no more than the mini-
mum sentence allowed by Indonesian law for crimes 
against humanity and does not reflect the magnitude of 
Guterres' appalling crimes. Furthermore, like the others 
who have been convicted so far, he will not serve his 
sentence until his appeal has been heard by the Supreme 
Court, which could take years. 
Guterres was charged in relation to an attack on the home 
of independence leader Manuel Carrascalao in Dili on 17 
April 1999 in which twelve East Timorese, including 
Carrascalao's son, were brutally murdered. He was recorded 
on film inciting thousands of militiamen 'to capture and kill 
if you need' independence supporters who had 'betrayed 
integration [with Indonesia]'. He was not charged in rela-
tion to his alleged responsibility for other violent attacks 
whic~ took place on the same day and on numerous other 
occas10ns. 
Crucially, the proceedings against Guterres and others 
have failed to present the crimes in the context of a wide-
spread and systematic attack on the civilian population of 
East Timor, masterminded and directed by the Indonesian 
military, TNI. 
Despite the availability of overwhelming evidence that 
the violence was orchestrated by the TNI, it has been the 
prosecution policy to falsely portray the crimes as part of a 
conflict between two violent East Timorese factions which 
the Indonesian security forces failed to control. The whole 
process has been more an exercise in revisionism than 
justice. 
Five more acquitted, two convicted 
Two days after the Guterres verdict, the ad hoc court 
acquitted two Indonesian military officers, a police chief, 
and a government official, of crimes against humanity. 
Army Lieutenant Colonel Asep Kuswani, police 
Lieutenant Colonel Adios Salova and district head Leonita 
Martins were cleared of failing to prevent militias from 
attacking the church in the town of Liquica on 6 April 1999 
when more than fifty people were killed. 
Indonesia's police chief in Dili, Lieutenant Colonel Endar 
Priyanto, was cleared of failing to prevent the attack on 
Manuel Carrascalao's house on 17 April 1999. 
In late December, two more verdicts were announced, 
including another acquittal for an army officer. Colonel 
Yayat Sudradjat was cleared of a charge that he failed to 
prevent the attack on a church in Liquica on 6 April by the 
notorious Besi Merah Putih (red-and-white iron). Sudrajat 
was m 
command of 
the army's 
elite force, 
Kopassus, in 
East Timor. 
The judge, 
explaining 
the acquittal, 
s a i d : 
'Because of 
the absence 
of the line of 
command 
and effective 
control, the 
defendant 
cannot be 
legally 
punished or held Lt. Colonel Soedjarwo received a 5 years 
responsible for imprisonment 
the violations by 
the Besi Merah Putih who were not under his command.' 
In an article in The Canberra Times (7 January 2003), 
James Dunn described Sudradjat as 'surely one of those 
most responsible for the crimes against humanity that cost 
hundreds of lives and the near total destruction of the terri-
tory's towns and villages'. Dunn produced a comprehensive 
document for UNTAET (UN Transitional Administration in 
East Timor) about the Indonesian generals' involvement in 
the 1999 mayhem. He identified Sudradjat as 'a central 
actor' in that operation. From the time when senior army 
intelligence officers took the decision in mid-1998 to set up 
militia forces in East Timor, he writes, 'Sudradjat played a 
key role ... essentially as the link between the generals and 
the rr,iilitia commanders'. He says that according to militia 
witne~ses, 'he provided money to pay militia leaders, 
supplies of drugs to "make the militia brave" and operation 
directions.' · 
Three days before Sudradjat's acquittal, ·the ad hoc court 
for the first time found an army officer guilty. Lieutenant-
Colonel Soedjarwo, who headed the military command in 
Dili, was found guilty of failing to prevent militias from 
attacking the Dili Diocese and the home of Bishop Ximenes 
Belo. Soedjarwo was sentenced to five years, half the mini-
mum sentence provided for under Indonesian law. 
On 20 January 2003, Dili's former police chief, Lt. Col. 
Hulman Gultom, was found guilty of failing to prevent the 
attack on Manuel Carrascalao's house, which was the 
subject of the charges against Eurico Guterres. 
East Timor's foreign minister Jose Ramos Horta described 
the November acquittals as 'scandalous' [Lusa, 29 
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November 2002]. However, Horta has also said that East 
Timor may not seek a UN tribunal to deal with the 
Indonesian army's atrocities in East Timor. He said that his 
government is considering an alternative solution 'to satisfy 
the public's demand for justice'. He went on: 'We have to 
think about the consequences if we are to demand an inter-
national tribunal, what problems will emerge especially as 
far as our relations with Indonesia are concerned' [ AFP, 
reported in The Jakarta Post, 19 November, 2003]. One 
solution suggested by Horta is an international Truth 
Commission, but it is doubtful whether such a mechanism 
could be an adequate alternative to an international criminal 
tribunal as a means of justice. 
A 'sham' process 
The ad hoc court has now delivered verdicts against 15 
accused. Two of the four convicted are East Timorese civil-
ians. As well as Eurico Guterres, former East Timor 
Governor, Abilio Soares, was convicted of crimes against 
humanity in August 2002 and sentenced to three years 
imprisonment (well below the legal minimum of ten years). 
At the same time, six Indonesian army and police officers 
were acquitted [see TAPOL Bulletin No. 168, News Flash, p 
19]. 
One of Indonesia's leading human rights activists, 
Hendardi, has called the whole process 'a sham'. He said the 
pattern was clear from the start when senior officers, includ-
ing General Wiranto, armed forces commander at the time, 
was not named as a suspect. He said that the decision to 
sentence one army officer was 'only a way to respond to 
international criticism generated by all the other acquittals.' 
Soares and Guterres were rightly found guilty of serious 
crimes, but their convictions are part of a pattern which fits 
perfectly with the revisionist view that the East Timorese 
themselves were primarily responsible for the violence. 
Three more cases out of the 18 before the ad hoc court are 
yet to be concluded, including that of the most senior army 
officer to go on trial, Major-General Adam Damiri. Damiri 
was the regional military commander based in Denpasar, 
Bali (which included East Timor under its command) at the 
time of the killings and devastation of East Timor before, 
during and after the August 1999 independence ballot. At 
one point, the hearing against Damiri was suspended when 
the court announced that arrangements for Bishop Belo to 
testify through a video connection had not been honoured. 
Subsequently, Bishop Belo issued a statement strongly 
denying that he had ever agreed to testify in this or any 
other trial before Indonesia's ad hoc court. 
Limitations of East Timor's serious 
crimes process . . 
In East Timor itself, the Special Panel for Senous Cnmes 
has issued 46 indictments against 141 alleged perpetrators 
of serious crimes, including ten Indonesian military offi-
cers. The Panel has convicted 23 persons, but none of them 
are Indonesian military officers, who are effectively beyond 
the reach of the East Timorese courts. At the end of 
December 2002, 84 of the 141 persons indicted rem~ined at 
large in Indonesia. Again, the fact that only East T1~.ore.se 
are being convicted could be used to boost the rev1s10mst 
version of events. 
Investigations are continuing and further indictments are 
expected soon. However, while it is becoming more effec-
tive the serious crimes process is beset by its own problems 
related to a lack of proper planning, inadequate and insuffi-
cient resources, a lack of co-operation from the Indonesian 
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authorities, and serious delays in the appointment of judges. 
The Court of Appeal has not sat for over a year and appel-
lants held in detention are being denied an expeditious hear-
ing of their appeals. There contunues to be concern also 
about the resources and personnel available to the Defence 
Unit, whcih provides lawyers for the accused. 
The mandate of the current UN mission, UNMISET, 
comes to an end on 1 July 2004 and it is not yet clear what 
support the East Timorese government is willing and able to 
provide for the continuation of the process. The indications 
are that it gives greater priority to promoting reconciliation 
and forging closer links with the Indonesian government. 
International options under consideration 
The unquestionable failure of the Indonesian judicial 
process means that the case for international accountability 
for crimes committed in East Timor is indisputable. Even 
western powers, whose foreign policy priority for Indonesia 
is the 'war on terror' and the resumption of full military ties, 
have admitted concern about the trials. 
In its response to the recent acquittals, the US State 
Department said it would 'begin once again exploring inter-
national options for bringing to justice those responsible for 
atrocities in East Timor' [statement to East Timor Action 
Network, December 2002]. After the first series of verdicts 
in August, the British Foreign Office said that if the perfor-
mance of the ad hoc court did not improve, it would 
'certainly consider the case for an international tribunal with 
our EU partners and others in the international community' 
[letter to TAPOL, 26 September 2002]. 
Justice symposium 
In January 2003, TAPOL took part in a symposium on 
'Justice for International Crimes Committed in the Territory 
of East Timor' organised by the Asia Pacific Centrre for 
continued on page 12 
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More Kopassus crimes in Papua 
The shooting dead of three employees of the Freeport copper-and-gold mine in Timika, West Papua 
has added to the list of cases involving the army's elite corps. There is strong evidence that 
Kopassus members were involved in the murders. But now that the armed forces have seized 
control of the investigations, a cover-up is likely. However, seven Kopassus officers have gone on 
trial accused of the murder in November 2001 of West Papuan independence leader, Theys Eluay. 
In both of these cases, the investigations have failed to 
examine the motivation of those responsible for planning 
the crimes but have focused exclusively on the perpetrators. 
Human rights and other civil society organisations have 
expressed their dismay at this tum of events and have called 
for independent investigations. 
The Freeport murders 
It was around midday on 31 August that a convoy of 
buses transporting teachers and children from Freeport's 
international school in Timika was attacked by gunmen. 
Three teachers were shot dead, an Indonesian and two 
Americans, while twelve adults and a child were injured. 
Major-General Mahidin Simbolon, the military commander 
of Papua, lost no time in blaming the OPM, the Free Papua 
Organisation, for the shooting. The allegation was quickly 
backed by a claim that a gunman, allegedly one of the 
killers, had been shot dead some hours later, during a search 
of the area; he was said to be a member of the OPM. But an 
autopsy of this unidentified man later revealed that he died 
some time before the attack, suggesting that the body had 
been planted to scapegoat the OPM. Investigations subse-
quently conducted by the human rights organisation, 
ELSHAM (Institute for the Study and Advocacy of Human 
Rights) and the provincial police have pointed to the 
involvement of members of the army's elite corps, 
Kopassus, in the murderous attack. 
The OPM is not known to have directed attacks against 
civilians, Indonesian or foreign. While kidnappings have 
been carried out by OPM units, the killing of foreigners has 
never be part of their strategy. In a set of Principles of 
Operation announced in June last year, the OPM under Kelly 
Kwalik which is based in Timika said: 'Ordinary Indonesians 
or white people are not the enemy of the OPM'. In a state-
ment issued a day after the Freeport employees were killed, 
Kelly Kwalik said: "I say to the TNI: don't dare accuse us of 
being involved in the attack on the Freeport employees. For 
many years since 1977, we have maintained our physical 
attacks and we announce every attack to the TNI.' 
Less than a week before the killings, John Rumbiak of 
ELSHAM met the OPM leader in Timika and obtained his 
agreement not to engage in acts of violence. This was part 
of a series of meetings Rumbiak held with OPM leaders, to 
secure their support for the idea of creating a Zone of Peace 
in Papua. 
Crisis in Freeport security arrangements 
The military have a vested interest in ensuring that its role 
in handling security for the hugely profitable mine is 
preserved. Only 25 per cent of the armed forces budget is 
covered by the state budget, meaning that it has to rely on a 
number of legal and illegal methods to help cover the 
deficit. An incident of this nature could well have been 
intended as a warning to Freeport not to deprive the army of 
this important source of income. 
Freeport's outlay for the security arrangements is believed 
to have amounted to US$34.8 million in the five years from 
1996. According to Tempo Magazine (January 14-20, 
2002), the company spends between US$4 million and 
US$6 million a year to support the logistical needs of the 
armed forces. Around 80 per cent of this is paid in kind, the 
remainder going in supplementary allowances to the 
soldiers who guard the property. 
The shooting happened at a time when security arrange-
ments for the mine, the world's large copper-and-gold mine, 
were under severe strain. Security for the mine has been the 
responsibility of the military for many years. During the 
past year, there have been reports of thefts of Freeport prop-
erty on several occasions by security officers but according 
to ELSHAM, the company has taken no action to deal with 
these crimes. 
Immediately following the killings, John Rumbiak, in 
Australia at the time, said he did not believe that the OPM 
was involved and called for an independent inquiry into the 
incident, involving Americans. 
Australian scholar, Denise Leith, who published a book 
late last year about Freeport, said that the adoption in the 
US of the Corporate Fraud Act in August made company 
CEOs personally accountable for their financial statements. 
Top Freeport-McMoran executives in the US signed up to 
this legislation. This would make it more difficult for the 
company to make unlawful payments to the military for 
security arrangements. This may have affected Freeport's 
relationship with the Indonesian military, she said, because 
'the company has been accused for many years of paying 
money to the Indonesian military. There certainly have been 
recorded incidents of them paying money into the .military's 
bank accounts. Now if Freeport continue to do this, they're 
going to be held responsible.' 
Senior officers planned the attack? 
On 3 November, The Washington Post came out with a 
startling report that shook the military establishment in 
Indonesia. It quoted intelligence sources as saying that the 
ambush of the Freeport convoy was discussed in advance 
by senior army officers. 
'The discussions involved the top ranks oflndonesia's mili-
tary, including Endriartono Sutarto, the influential comman-
der in chief, and were aimed at discrediting a Papuan sepa-
ratist group, the Free Papua Movement, said the US govern-
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ment official and another American source. The intelli-
gence was based on information supplied after the ambush 
by a person who claimed to be knowledgeable about the 
high-level military conversations. The source was 
described in the report as "highly reliable". 
'This information was supported by an intercept of a 
conversation including that individual, said the U.S. 
government official and the American source. The intercept 
was shared with the United States by another country, iden-
tified by a Western source as Australia.' 
Endriartono responded furiously, and announced his inten-
tion to sue the newspaper for libel and demand $1 million 
in damages. 
ELSHAM has also been warned that it will 
be sued by the military for suggesting that 
Kopassus may have been involved in the 
killings. In a report of their investigations 
made public on 25 September, an eye-
witness who had been enlisted to assist 
Kopassus as an auxiliary was quoted as 
saying that Kopassus soldiers were involved 
in the shooting. It was the military comman-
der of Papua, Major-General Mahidin 
Simbolon who is himself from Kopassus, 
who announced his intention to sue 
ELSHAM. Activists working for the human 
rights organisation have since been the target 
of intimidation and in late December, the wife and daughter 
of the organisation's executive director, Johannes Bonay 
were shot at and wounded. (See below.) 
Kopassus members accused 
Confirming what ELSHAM had said two months earlier, 
the deputy police chief of Papua, Brig.General Raziman 
Tarigan, announced in mid-November that eleven members 
of the army's elite force, Kopassus, have been named as 
suspects in the Freeport killings. He said the evidence about 
the officers' involvement had come from statements made 
by a local Papuan resident named Decky Murib who was 
also involved in the operation. According to Tarigan foren-
sic tests showed that military-issue weapons including an 
M16 machine gun, an SS-1 rifle and a mouser rifle were 
used in the attack. He said that these weapons are used by 
the army in the area. [Jakarta Post, 22 December 2002.] 
This announcement led to a furious row between the army 
and the police, with senior army spokesmen insisting that 
the witness was lying. 
However, according to The Washington Post issue, quoted 
above, a U.S. government official had confirmed that 'the 
FBI briefed State Department and embassy officials about 
three weeks ago on the bureau's own investigation of the 
attack. FBI investigators have visited Papua as part of the 
probe. 
' "The indications have pointed in that direction [of the 
military] but are not conclusive," the official said. The FBI 
is still interviewing witnesses, Freeport contract employees 
and their family members who have returned to the United 
States, he said.' 
Deputy Defence Secretary Paul Wolfowitz said it was 
'very disturbing' that the military might be involved. 'And 
if it's true, I think it is extremely important for the govern-
ment to get to the bottom of it.' 
As we were going to press, there was intense pressure on 
the Megawati government from Washington for a thorough-
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going investigation and a request that an FBI team visit 
Timika again to continue with its investigations. 
Police deputy chief pulled from case 
Meanwhile, in a surprise move it was announced in early 
January that deputy police chief Brig.General Raziman 
Tarigan had been pulled from the investigation and with-
drawn from Papua. Also withdrawn from the case and 
removed from his post was Police Commissioner H. 
Sumarjiyo, the police chief of Mimika (which covers 
Timika) who was also convinced of the involvement of 
Kopassus in the murders. 
At the same time, it was Members of Kopassus on trial 
announced that a joint 
investigation team of the police and the army, a so-called 
koneksitas team was being set up to take over the investiga-
tion of the Freeport killings. With the two police officers out 
of the way, this was clearly a move to enable the military to 
establish its version of the crime. 
This is a case in which Washington needs to know the 
truth and explains their insistence on the FBI's involvement 
in the investigations. President Bush has been on the phone 
to President Megawati about the case. It comes at a time 
when Congress is due to consider lifting the ban on US sales 
of military equipment and the provision of training to the 
Indonesian military. 
Kontras, the Commission for the Disappeared and Victims 
of Violence, condemned the decision to set up a joint team 
of investigation and insisted that criminal investigations 
were the sole responsibility of the police. The army's 
involvement in the investigations was clearly aimed at 
protecting the military and ensuring that the investigations 
would be limited to the men who carried out the operation 
(if indeed even the military police are compelled to accept 
that Kopassus officers were involved), while covering up 
the chain of command responsible for ordering the ambush, 
the organisation said. 'By imposing a koneksitas investiga-
tion, the armed forces have moved to safeguard their 
impunity and protect the armed forces against legal 
charges,' Kontras said. 
Kopassus officers accused of Theys murder 
Seven members of Kopassus went on trial before a mili-
tary court in Surabaya in early January for the murder of the 
independence leader, Theys Hiyo Eluay. Eluay was the 
president of the Papuan Presidium Council which was set 
up at a congress attended by thousands of people in 
Jayapura in May-June 2000. 
There is widespread scepticism in Papua that the trials will 
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mete out justice. 'Soldiers killed him and soldiers will try 
the case. What kind of justice is that?' said Tom Beanal, 
who was Eluay's deputy on the Council. 
Eluay was found dead in his car on 11 November 2001 , 
several hours after attending a Kopassus dinner at the 
Kopassus Tribuana headquarters in Hamadi, near Jayapura. 
He had been invited to attend the event by Lt.Colonel 
Hartomo, commander of the base. Hartomo is one of the 
seven men now being charged in connection with his death. 
The driver of Eluay's car, Aristoteles Masuko, disappeared 
after returning to the Kopassus base, intending to report that 
the car had been hijacked and he had been ejected from the 
Commemoration of the death of Theys Eluay one year ago 
vehicle. However, the trial is dealing only with the murder 
of Theys, and not with the driver's disappearance. 
According to the indictment, after the dinner, Lt.Colonel 
Hartomo ordered two of his men to accompany Eluay on his 
journey home. During the journey, one of the soldiers 
clamped his hand over the Papuan leader's mouth several 
times until he stopped breathing. 
The indictment alleges that Hartomo discovered that Theys 
was planning to re-affirm West Papua's independence on 1 
December, the anniversary of the declaration in 1961. He 
had therefore instructed some of his men to accompany the 
Papuan leader in his car and try to persuade him not to go 
ahead with this plan. Theys rejected the request and, accord-
ing to the prosecution, he started swearing at the soldiers. As 
the discussion became more acrimonious, the driver threat-
ened to halt the car and draw attention to passersby. He then 
did this, shouting, 'thief, thief, with Theys joining in. The 
driver is then said to have run away , and one of the soldiers 
took over the wheel and drove the car to Kaya. Inside the 
vehicle, according to the indictment, Theys continued to 
scream words of abuse, whereupon one of the soldiers 
clamped his hand over the Papuan leader's mouth to keep 
him quiet. He did this three times and then realised that the 
Papuan leader was dead. The soldiers then abandoned the 
car and were picked up by a second vehicle carryin~ soldiers 
which had followed the Papuan leader's car when It left the 
base and were driven back to base. When they reported the 
incident to their commander, Hartomo, he told them to get 
some rest and did not report the incident to his superi?rs but 
instead watched the security situation to see what the Impact 
of the incident might be. . 
The indictment seems designed to stress that the soldiers 
who killed Theys had been provoked by his belligerence 
and his determined stand on the question of independence 
for his country. Although the charge they face carries a 
maximum sentence of 15 years, it appears likely that the 
military court will deal very 
leniently with the men 
because of these alleged 
circumstances. The only 
person who could have given 
a different account of what 
happened in the vehicle is 
Aristoteles Masuko, but he 
has disappeared, after return-
ing to the Kopassus base, and 
is presumed dead. 
ELSHAM director's 
wife shot 
On 28 December, the wife 
and daughter of Johannes 
Bonay, executive director of 
ELSHAM were shot at and 
wounded while being driven 
back to Jayapura from the 
border with Papua New 
Guinea. A woman friend who 
was travelling with them was 
also wounded. Else 
Rumbiak, Bonay's wife, and 
her female companion, Yeni 
Ireuw Meraundje, were both shot in the leg. Yeni was later 
flown to Jakarta for special treatment because of the seri-
ousness of her injuries. Madina Bonay, Bonay's daughter, 
sustained an injury to her shoulder. 
It is very likely that the gunmen's target was Bonay himself 
who originally intended to accompany his wife on the jour-
ney, but decided at the last minute not to travel with her. The 
three women were on their way to Vanimo in PNG but when 
they arrived at a border post quite early in the morning, 
there were no immigration officials to check their docu-
ments so they decided to return to Jayapura. Later attempts 
to investigate the scene of the crime were called off when 
the police were shot at by unknown individuals. 
ELSHAM's deputy director, Allosyus Renwarin later 
linked this attack to the activities of Johannes Bonay. He 
said that the tires of Bonay's car had recently been slashed 
and the phone at the family's home had been mysteriously 
disconnected. (Jakarta Post, 29 December) Renwarin 
would not speculate on who might have been responsible 
for the shooting but drew attention to the fact that it 
occurred only 100 metres from a military post. He said that 
the men who made the attack appear to have been profes-
sional; forty bullets were fired at the vehicle at close range. 
(AP, 29 December) * 
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BP in West Papua: the Tangguh project 
BP's massive $2 billion liquified natural gas (LNG) project in Bintuni Bay, West Papua, will make 
the London-based multinational Indonesia's largest single foreign investor. The company is eager 
to demonstrate that the project will be developed and operated in a socially and environmentally 
responsible way, in consultation with local communities. But NGOs monitoring developments and 
independent visitors to the site continue to raise questions about the real impact and dangers of the 
project, and the link between BP's presence and human rights violations in the surrounding area. 
Bintuni Bay, the site of BP's Tangguh project, 
is located in one of West Papua's remotest 
regions in the Bird's Head region. The area 
contains the largest remaining mangroves in 
South East Asia. 
BP's $2 billion Tangguh project involves gas 
exploitation from offshore gas platforms and 
pipelines which will channel gas to an LNG 
processing plant on the shore. The processed gas 
will then be taken by ship to export markets. 
The project base-camp, which is surrounded by 
indigenous coastal villages and rainforest, has 
already been built and the construction of a port 
and airstrip is underway. Construction of the 
processing plant will begin later this year. 
The project area covers 3,164 hectares on the 
southern shore of Bintuni Bay, which is on the 
adat land of local indigenous peoples. The gas 
plant itself will occupy at least 600 hectares of 
rainforest. 
BP estimates that around 4,200 villagers will be 
directly affected by the project. To make way for the devel-
opment over 500 villagers will be moved to a new location 
3.5 km to the west. 
The facility is expected to be operational by 2006, and will 
eventually export 7 million tons of LNG each year. 
Proposed expansion plans could quadruple this output. The 
project has secured a US$8 billion contract with China's 
state-owned oil company, CNOOC, to supply 2.6 million 
tonnes per year of LNG over 25 years. 
Will Tangguh be different? 
As one of the world's biggest oil companies, British 
Petroleum has had its fair share of international criticism. 
The company has been the subject of numerous AGM and 
shareholder actions, and Multinational Monitor included 
BP in its list of the 10 worst corporations of 2000. The 
company has come in for heavy criticisms over its Baku-
Ceyhan pipeline - a major oil and gas pipeline project 
planned for Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, where an inter-
national investigation revealed the potential for major nega-
tive environmental and social impacts. [See Some 
Common Concerns, published by Friends of the Earth 
International/Platform/The Comer House/Kurdish Human 
Rights Project/CEE Bankwatch Network/Campagna per la 
Riforma della Banca Mondiale.] The company has also 
been criticised for its operations in Colombia, where it has 
not yet taken sufficient action to resolve many problems, 
including compensation for 350 peasant smallholders. 
[source: Colombia Solidarity Campaign.] 
0 
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Against this backdrop, BP is eager to demonstrate that the 
Tangguh project will be different, and that the company has 
learnt from its past mistakes. 
It has produced an Environmental and Social Impact 
Assessment (Amdal) which has been approved by the 
Indonesian government, has undertaken local consultations, 
set up funds for community projects, and is conducting a 
human rights impact assessment. However, Friends of the 
Earth Indonesia (WALHI) refuse to recognise the Amdal -
on the basis that it has failed to go through the proper legal 
channels. Human rights NGOs are also concerned that the 
human rights impact assessment has not yet been made 
public - despite the fact that work on the project is currently 
going ahead. 
BP's ongoing consultations with local people indicate the 
scale at which the project will disrupt traditional patterns of 
life for the many communities in the region. Whilst BP 
claims to advocate 'community-led development', doubts 
remain as to how much negotiating power local communi-
ties really have in relation to one of the world's most power-
ful multinationals. In May 50 local people from Saengga 
village blockaded the project's base camp, protesting at BP's 
failure to follow up on agreements made at an April work-
shop. The Manokwari Alliance for Tangguh Advocacy 
responded to the crisis by calling for a moratorium on 
Tangguh, followed by open consultations and greater provi-
sion of information on likely impacts, so local people were 
in a better position to "deliberate and choose what is best for 
them". More recently TAPOL has heard of at least one local 
NGO that has refused to participate in the consultations. 
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[JATAM, Kerebok, Vol 3 No. 21; Down To Earth, 
Newsletter 53-54.] 
Beyond the specific developmental and environmental 
issues raised by the project, it is clear that whatever the 
status of BP's local consultations, communities do not have 
a right to veto the project. 
However, regardless of whether BP has good intentions or 
is simply offering up 21st century 'greenwash', the political 
and military situation in the province means that very real 
risks are incurred in the development and operation of a 
nationally significant mega-project like Tangguh. Whilst 
some of those financial risks are necessarily borne by the 
company, the social, environmental and human rights risks 
will be borne by local people and the environment which 
provides local communities with their long-term livelihoods. 
The military and the mega-project 
West Papua's other mega-project is the controversial 
Freeport/Rio Tinto mine, which has been linked to 
increased militarisation, human rights atrocities, disregard 
of land and indigenous rights and major environmental 
destruction. 
Notwithstanding BP's genuine or cosmetic efforts to the 
contrary, the situation in West Papua means that Tangguh 
could become another Freeport. 
A key concern for human rights organisations is the role 
of the military in relation to mega-projects. BP have sought 
to reassure NGOs that security for Tangguh will be 
provided by local people, not the military - but their policy 
of 'community-based security' remains unclear and unreal-
istic. A major problem is the established practice of the 
military providing security for projects of national impor-
tance - projek vital, or 'provits'. The military has special 
units called PAM Provit (Pasukan Pengamanan Projek 
Vital, Troops Securing Vital Projects), and there is expecta-
tion within the military that their services will be called 
upon to protect such projects. 
In March 2001, Indonesia's military commander for West 
Papua, Major General Simbolon, visited BP's base camp at 
Bintuni. He identified the Tangguh project as a provit - a 
project requiring military protection. 
The Indonesian Parliament has endorsed a new bill to 
form 14 new districts in Papua - including one in Bintuni 
Bay. As each new district will require an additional layer of 
military presence, increased militarisation around the 
project area and in its vicinity will become inevitable. 
[Jakarta Post, 13 November 2002.] 
Human Rights violations in Wasior 
On 13 June 2001 British Ambassador Richard Gozney 
visited BP's Tangguh base camp in Bintuni Bay. On the 
same day five Brimob troops were killed in Wasior. On 4 
May the same Brimob platoon killed six Papuans and 
arrested 16 others - also in Wasior. [Eben Kirksey, Savage 
Colonial States, quoting Courier Mail, 15106101, p 15.] 
Some Papuans believe army intelligence agents initiated 
the Wasior killings and evidence suggests security forces 
ammunition and possibly guns were used. 
Subsequent human rights violations in Wasior have 
included over 140 incidents of detention, torture and ill 
treatment, a death in custody and at least seven extra judi-
cial killings. A prominent local human rights investigator 
has been denied access and in 2002 an Amnesty 
International research team decided to abandon the mission 
because of doubts being raised about visas. . 
Following numerous interviews in the re~10!1 around 
Tangguh, Eben Kirksey has suggested that the t1mmg o~ ~he 
13 June killings to coincide with the visit ?f the ~r.1tJsh 
Ambassador 'suggests that West Papua's reg10nal m1htary 
command may be attempting to send BP a message: work 
with us'. [Ibid. pl2.] 
Other commentators who have spent time in the region, 
including Papuan human rights investigators, have 
described the 13 June killings as 'manufactured instability', 
which was 'incited by elements in the military ... hoping to 
secure the desired contract with BP'. [Down To Earth, 
Newsletter 55, p 12 and ELSHAM report, August 2001.] 
Militarisation and fear for human rights 
It is the sheer magnitude of the Tangguh project which 
makes it so important for both BP and, crucially, the 
Indonesian state. With many Papuans opposing rule from 
Jakarta, and a well-established independence movement 
(civilian, political and military), the significance of 
Tangguh cannot be ignored. 
For economic as well as political reasons, Jakarta needs to 
demonstrate its authority by ensuring the smooth running of 
the Tangguh project. The military, for its part, will clearly 
exploit this need in order to consolidate its position. 
In these ways, and regardless of BP's intentions, Tangguh 
is one reason for the increased militarisation of Papua. This 
cannot be good for human rights. * 
Unemployment threatens millions 
The Bali blast in October last year is set to have a devas-
tating impact on Indonesia's most serious economic and 
social problem, the high and soaring level of unemploy-
ment. 
None of the governments since the fall of Suharto in May 
1998 has made any impact on the problem and unemploy-
ment today stands at 38 million. A government minister 
gloomily forecast in November last year that two million 
more could lose their jobs as a result of the expected fall in 
tourism not only in Bali but in other major tourist attrac-
tions in Indonesia. Co-ordinating Minister for Social 
Welfare, JusufKalla, said that unemployment in Bali alone 
could rise by 600,000. The impact would also be felt in 
East and Central Java as industries and workshops in these 
provinces supply around 70 per cent of the souvenirs sold 
in Bali. [Jakarta Post, 8 November 2002] 
The problem is made even worse by the decision of many 
foreign investors to halt operations in Indonesia without 
notice and move elsewhere. During 2002, eight textile and 
garment factories in Greater Jakarta abruptly stopped oper-
ations leaving thousands of workers without jobs. In 
September, an Indonesian company, PT Doson Indonesia, 
contracted to make Nike shoes, ceased operations, leaving 
nearly 7,000 workers jobless, the vast majority of whom 
were told that severance pay would have to wait until the 
company's assets had been sold off. The Jakarta Post (21 
November 2002) reported that Nike had reduced its orders 
continued on page 14 
26 TAPOL Bulletin No. 169/170, January/February 2003 
WEST PAPUA 
Solidarity for West Papua grows stronger 
Over 50 activists from around the world gathered in London at the beginning of October to attend 
the Third International Solidarity Meeting on West Papua. The participants heard reports from a 
number of prominent West Papuan speakers about the continuing tragedy of their country and 
devised a plan of solidarity action for the forthcoming year. 
The keynote speakers included Agus Alua, the Vice 
Secretary General of the Papuan Presidium Council - West 
Papua's largest political organisation, which represents 
widespread support for self-determination throughout the 
territory - Yusan Yeblo, the regional coordinator of 
Solidaritas Perempuan Papua (Solidarity of Papuan 
Women), Theo Sitokdana of the human rights group ELS-
HAM, and Emmy Sahertian, the programme coordinator of 
the Jakarta-based SNUP (Solidaritas Nasional Untuk 
Papua, National Solidarity for Papua). 
The solidarity movement was considerably strengthened 
by the participation of activists from 15 different countries 
including Indonesia, Australia, the US and various 
European countries. The meeting was able to build on the 
successes of the first two meetings held in the Netherlands 
and Germany in 2000 and 2001 . 
Discussions and strategic planning revolved around the 
issues of self-determination, human rights, women's rights, 
environment/development and media. 
The Meeting looked at ways of increasing support for a 
UN review of the 'Act of Free Choice' [see TAPOL Bulletin 
No. 166/167, p. 27] and for the establishment of a 'Zone of 
Peace' in West Papua. Input was provided by Octo Mote of 
the Papuan Resource Center in the US, who was unable to 
attend the Meeting. 
Noting that the human rights situation in West Papua has 
deteriorated since the Second Solidarity Meeting, partici-
pants determined to call for accountability for numerous 
killings and rights violations. These issues will be taken up 
with the members of the UN Commission on Human Rights 
who will be asked to press for visits to West Papua of UN 
human rights experts. 
The issue of women's rights was addressed separately and 
participants considered ways of promoting the role of West 
Papuan women and of co-ordinating solidarity at the local, 
national and international levels. 
The Meeting received a report from Katie Wilson of the 
Oxford West Papua Friendship Association about her recent 
visit to BP's Tangguh gas project in Bintuni Bay. Further 
input was provided in absentia by Roberth Mandosir of the 
environmental group, YALI. Numerous ideas were put 
forward for future action in relation to the Freeport mine, 
the BP Tangguh project and other environmental concerns, 
such as logging and the general linkage between resource 
extraction and rights violations. 
The Meeting issued the following statement and agreed to 
convene in 2003, possibly in New Zealand at the time of the 
meeting of the Pacific Islands Forum. 
Statement of the Third International Solidarity 
Meeting on West Papua. 
The Third International Solidarity Meeting on West Papua, 
meeting in London from October 4-6, 2002, attended by 
over 20 organisations from 15 countries, confirmed its full 
support for the exercise of self-determination by the people 
of West Papua, a right belonging to all peoples in the world. 
The Meeting called on the Government of the Republic of 
Indonesia to enter into a process of peaceful dialogue with 
the West Papua leadership, including the Papuan Presidium 
Council, and mediated by a third neutral party. 
It called on the international community and the 
Government of the Republic of Indonesia to support the 
proposal of the West Papuan people to declare West Papua 
a Zone of Peace. It therefore called in particular on the 
Government of the Republic of Indonesia to withdraw the 
Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) and Mobile Police Force 
(Brimob) from the territory of West Papua. 
It called on all UN member states to request UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan to review the UN's conduct in relation 
to the discredited 'Act of Free Choice' in 1968-1969, which 
was part of a fraudulent attempt to legitimise West Papua's 
take-over by Indonesia. 
The Meeting declared its warm solidarity with the Jakarta-
based National Solidarity with Papua (Solidaritas Nasional 
Untuk Papua). 
The Meeting was deeply concerned at the further deterio-
ration of the human rights situation in West Papua. Leading 
human rights activists have received death threats following 
their efforts to investigate the killing in August 2002 of 
three employees of the Freeport mining company, and their 
discovery of evidence which suggests that members of the 
Indonesian army were involved. The Meeting stressed the 
urgent need for UN human rights monitors to visit West 
Papua and called for an independent team of experts to 
investigate the assassination last November ofTheys Eluay, 
the chairman of the Papuan Presidium Council. 
The Meeting recognised the important and unique role of 
Papuan women in society and in the struggle for human 
rights. It also recognised and encouraged the actions of 
Solidar(tas Perempuan Papua (Papuan Women's Solidarity) 
and other women's groups in upholding their political, socio-
economic and cultural rights. It called for a campaign to 
expose violations against Papuan women, including the crime 
of rape by the security forces and high levels of domestic 
violence. The Meeting urged aid agencies to support the 
Papuan women's struggle, including the provision of material 
aid, and to prioritise resources on empowerment of women at 
grassroots level, institution-building, and building women's 
skills - e.g. skills in information technology, in running meet-
ings, budgeting, report-writing, and the media. 
The Meeting called on the international community to 
press the Indonesian government to prevent the violation of 
the human rights of West Papuans, including their 
economic, social and cultural rights, by transnational 
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companies including Freeport McMoran, Rio Tinto and BP 
and by the Indonesian system of granting logging conces-
sions on indigenous customary lands. * 
London, October 6, 2002. 
Please contact TAPOL for more information about the 
Meeting and its outcomes. 
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of those arrested were released within a few days, as of 
mid January, eight people were still in detention. It is not 
known whether there is any intention to charge and try 
these detainees. 
A week later in Jayapura, about 500 people gathered 
outside the residence of the slain Papuan leader, Theys 
Eluay on l December and unfurled the Papuan flag along-
side the Indonesian flag and managed to keep the flag aloft 
until the evening. Scuffies with the police occurred when 
some people tried to lower the Indonesian flag. During the 
day, seven people were arrested. 
Later that month, a group of about fifty people who held 
an independence parade in the compound of Cendrawasih 
University were confronted by the police and three men 
were arrested. On this occasion, they were commemorat-
ing the declaration of West Melanesian independence 
conducted in 1988 by Dr Tom Wanggai on 14 December. 
On that occasion, Wanggai was arrested, tried and 
sentenced to twenty years. He died in 1996 while serving 
his sentence in Cipinang Prison, Jakarta. The return of his 
body for burial was the occasion of a huge demonstration 
in his support. 
During parade, three men were arrested. It was later 
announced that the three men would face charges under 
Articles l 06 and 108 of the Criminal Code, which carry a 
penalty of up to twenty years. Two of the men arrested, 
Edison Waromi and Yordan Ick, spent time in prison in 
Java after being arrested in 1988 together with Tom 
Wanggai. 
Clashes on the border 
In mid December, a number of clashes occurred in the 
vicinity of the border region of Wutung between a unit of 
the OPM and Indonesian security forces . The clashes have 
led to mutual recriminations between Indonesia and Papua 
New Guinea amid claims from the Indonesian se~~rity 
forces that the OPM launched its attack from pos1t10ns 
inside PNG, while PNG authorities have complain~d th~t 
the Indonesian security forces have crossed into their tem-
tory on several occasions in pursuit of the .oPM. 
It has also resulted in a major increase m the number ?f 
Indonesian troops stationed along the bard.er. It mid 
January, it was reported that 1,500 Indones!an troops, 
backed by helicopter gunships and fixed-wn~d spott~r 
planes were now operating in the border reg10n. [Asza 
Times, 14 January 2003] . 
The Indonesian government has also renewed its demai;id 
for an extradition treaty with PNG so as to be able to lay its 
hands on OPM leaders thought to be taking sanctuary 
across the border. While the PNG government under the 
recently elected Michael Somare is known to be sympa-
thetic to Jakarta, it may find it difficult to bow to Jakarta's 
wishes because of widespread sympathy in the country for 
Papuan living under Indonesian rule. 
The crisis on the border has also placed thousands of 
Papuan refugees in PNG at risk. Amid Indonesian allega-
tions that the refugee camps are being used by OPM fight-
ers as sanctuaries, there are reports that the refugee camps 
will be closed down and all the refugees will be forced to 
return to Indonesian territory. A large number of these 
refugees fled West Papua in 1984 following a massive 
clampdown in Jayapura. · 
In mid January, the Bishop of Vanimo, Cesare Bonivento, 
joined others in warning that the security of Papuan 
refugees is under threat because of the escalating military 
tensions along the border. 
TNI exercises in Papua 
At a time of heighten tensions in Papua, it was announced 
that 4,000 armed forces personnel from the army, navy and 
air force would take part in an amphibious exercise in 
Papua. 
The troops were seen off in Surabaya by the navy's 
Eastern Fleet commander, Rear Admiral I Wayan Rampe. 
He denied that this exercise was intended as a 'show of 
force' and said that it would be carried out entirely at sea. 
He also said that the general public in Papua had been 
invited to observe the exercise. [Media Indonesia, 8 January 
2003] * 
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1965-1966 massacre to be investigated 
Komnas HAM, the National Human Rights Commission has decided to initiate an investigation 
into the massacres that swept Indonesia in 1965 and 1966, when at least one million people were 
slaughtered. The newly constituted Komnas HAM has managed to overcome a long period of dead-
lock where pro and anti military factions were fighting each other. Some new initiatives have been 
launched and issues that were swept under the carpet are being raised. 
Although in the past few years, the National Human 
Rights Commission - Komnas HAM - has initiated many 
investigations into grave human rights abuses that were 
perpetrated during the regime of General Suharto, the most 
serious case of all has not until now been mentioned as 
warranting the attention of the country's official human 
rights body. 
The Commission has now set up an Ad Hoc Team to 
Investigate Grave Human Rights Abuses by Suharto. 
Chairing the team is M.M. Billah who said at a press confer-
ence on 3 January that of all incidents during the Suharto 
regime, the bloody happenings in 1965 are thought to be the 
worst case of human rights abuse. 
The killings began in the third week of October, 1965, in 
Central Java and spread like wildfire from province to 
province. The army, under the command of General 
Suharto, who had taken over the helm earlier that month 
following the assassination of six generals, including armed 
forces commander General Yani, spearheaded the killings, 
inciting others to take part. Estimates of the numbers killed 
vary from half a million to three million. An investigation 
undertaken in late 1965 at the request of President Sukarno, 
who was still formally the country's president, arrived at a 
figure of 78,000 dead, but members of the team later said 
that the figure was certainly far higher. 
Billah said that the composition of the team is still under 
consideration. It will have fifteen members, he explained, 
adding: 'They must be people who were never in any way 
involved in the Suharto government, had never been his 
underlings and were not close to Suharto.' 
He said the team would also investigate a number of other 
human rights crimes for which Suharto can be held respon-
sible, including the so-called 'mysterious killings' during the 
mid-1980s, the Tanjung Priok atrocity in September 1984, 
killings in Aceh during the 'military operational zone' 
period from 1989 till 1998 in Aceh and the kidnapping of 
activists in the closing months of 1997. 
May 1998 riots to be investigated 
Komnas HAM also announced that it had set up a team to 
investigate the riots that occurred from 13 - 15 May 1998, 
during which many hundreds of mainly ethnic Chinese 
Indonesians were killed and scores of ethnic Chinese 
women were raped. These riots, which followed huge 
student demonstrations calling on the dictator to stand 
down, precipitated his fall from power later that month. 
This team will be headed by Komnas HAM member, 
Solahuddin Wahid. 
In July 1998, the riots were the subject of an investigation 
by a Joint Fact-Finding Team, known by its Indonesian 
initials as TGPF. The findings and recommendations of the 
team were never acted on. The head of the TGPF, Marzuki 
Darusman, announcing the results, said that members of 
the military and the political elite were directly involved in 
the riots and had instigated the atrocities in the hope that by 
provoking chaos, they could justify the imposition of 
martial law. One of the names he mentioned as being 
responsible for the riots was then Major-General Syafrie 
Syamsuddin who was military commander of Jakarta at the 
time. Syafrie is now the official spokesman of the armed 
forces, the TNI. [See TAPOL Bulletin Nos 148, September 
1998 and 149/150, December 1998.] 
While a team of humanitarian activists, the Tim Relawan, 
concluded earlier that 168 women had been raped or gang-
raped during the riots, the TGPF reached a lower figure but 
it was recognised at the time that this team had not been 
able to complete its investigations because of outside pres-
sure hampering its work. * 
TERROR MERAJALELA: Pelanggaran Hak Asasi 
Manusia di Aceh 1998 - 2000, March 2001 
Translation of TAPOL Publication, A Reign of Terror: 
Human Rights Violations in Aceh 1998-2000 
TAPOL Bulletin No. 169, January/February 2003 29 
BOOK REVIEW 
John Saltford, The United Nations and the 
Indonesian Takeover of West Papua, 1962-1969: 
The Anatomy of Betrayal, Routledge-Curzon, 
2002 
Few people doubt that the vast majority of West Papuans 
crave independence from Indonesia. Even members of an 
EU mission that visited Papua a year ago to test support for 
special autonomy admitted privately that support for inde-
pendence is overwhelming. Under Suharto, when any 
expression in favour of merdeka courted imprisonment or 
worse, the craving did not diminish. Indonesia's first post-
Suharto presidents, B.J. Habibie and Abdurrahman Wahid 
recognised the strength of feeling and sought to allow space 
for Papuan feelings to express themselves. Not so 
Indonesia's present leader, Megawati Sukarnoputri, whose 
commitment to the country's territorial integrity is total. 
But it was under her father, Sukarno, that Indonesia 
agreed, under pressure from the United States, to enter into 
a UN-brokered agreement with The Netherlands to allow an 
act of self-determination to take place, 'in accordance with 
international practice', as stipulated by the New York 
Agreement of August 1962. Although that agreement was 
aimed more at averting a war that would have driven 
Indonesia onto the 'wrong side' in the Cold War, it did make 
provisions not only for an act of self-determination but also 
acknowledged an obligation to protect the political rights 
and freedoms of the Papuan people. 
Whilst it was the US that forced the two sides to the 
negotiating table and a US diplomat was in charge of medi-
ating the talks, once the agreement had been concluded, 
Washington turned its attention away and did nothing to 
ensure implementation, leaving it to the United Nations, 
under Secretary-General U Thant, to handle affairs from 
then on. Indeed, well before the 'Act of Free Choice', as the 
self-determination exercise was misleadingly called, had 
taken place, a major US company, Freeport-McMoran, had 
obtained Indonesia's consent for its exploitation of West 
Papua's copper and gold reserves, to build a mine that is the 
largest of its kind worldwide. 
John Saltford's writings on the 1969 'Act of Free Choice' 
have been widely published and his conclusion that the Act 
was a fraud will come as no surprise. What happened in 
West Papua - or Irian Barat as it was then known - bears no 
comparison with the UN-conducted referendum in East 
Timor in August 1999. Whereas the UN's role in 1969 'to 
advise, assist and participate' was implemented with a staff 
of sixteen persons including clerical staff, the UN deployed 
around one thousand UN officials, including 270 police, 
fifty military liaison officers and hundreds of electoral offi-
cials and administrators in East Timor three decades later. 
But Saltford's book, based on years of research for his 
PhD, shows that the UN betrayal goes far beyond what 
happened in 1969. In fact, his startling conclusion is that the 
'[UN] Secretariat's priority throughout was to ensure that 
the territory became a recognised part of Indonesia with the 
minimum of controversy and disruption'. And moreover: 
'This was a role that had been assigned to the UN by 
Washington in 1962 and U Thant saw no reason to deviate 
from it.' It was a scheme 'in which the rights of the Papuans 
counted for nothing'. 
The UN's role began with the creation of UNTEA (UN 
Temporary Executive Authority) in October 1962. Within 
two months, UNTEA, far from protecting the rights of the 
Papuan people, had colluded with the Indonesian authori-
ties already based in the territory to ban a demonstration 
planned for 1 December 1962 to mark the first anniversary 
of Papua's declaration of independence and the adoption of 
its flag, the Morning Star, while the Dutch were still in 
control of the territory. 
UNTEA's role in the territory officially came to an end 
on 1 May 1963, after which the New York Agreement stip-
ulated in Article XVI that UN officials should remain in the 
territory 'to advise and assist the authorities in preparation 
for self-determination'. But the Indonesian authorities who 
were now in full control never permitted this to happen; 
apart from some officials who occasionally visited the terri-
tory for the purposes of administering the UN Fund for 
West Irian (FUNDWI). As the author comments, 'one might 
have expected some form of protest from the (UN) at 
Jakarta's refusal to abide by Article XVI', but this never 
happened. Besides preventing the UN from keeping an eye 
on developments as they unfolded, it also meant that when 
a UN mission was appointed to 'assist' in preparations for 
the act of self-determination in 1969, there were no officials 
who were well acquainted with what had been happening 
in the intervening years. 
The author also reveals that the idea of conducting a 
'plebiscite' (a word never actually used in the New York 
Agreement because of objections from Indonesia) by means 
of regional councils deciding on behalf of the population 
whether or not to remain in Indonesia was first mooted by 
UN Under Secretary General Jose Rolz-Bennett as far back 
as 1964. This was basically the method used in 1969 though 
it has been publicly presented ever since as being an 
Indonesian plan 'without any mention of the UN's long-
standing support for the idea'. 
In late 1965, the political situation in Indonesia under-
went a profound change with the seizure of power by 
General Suharto. Attitudes by western powers towards 
Indonesia changed dramatically, and clearly, there was no 
enthusiasm to 'make a fuss' about how the consultation 
might be conducted. As one British diplomat said in a report 
to the Foreign Office in April 1968: 'I cannot imagine the 
US, Japanese, Dutch or Australian Governments putting at 
risk their economic and political relations with Indonesia on 
a matter of principle involving a relatively small number of 
very primitive people.' 
By this time, private British and Australian diplomatic 
exchanges revealed that the governments concerned had 
already made up their minds that there was no other solu-
tion than for Indonesia to keep West Irian. As one Australian 
diplomat is quoted as saying, 'the more quietly the act of 
self-determination passes off next year, the better'. 
In late 1968, a special UN representative, Ortiz Sanz, was 
appointed to head a mission to oversee the 'Act of Free 
Choice'. During the time he should have had a continual 
presence in the territory, several armed rebellions erupted 
and the Indonesian army used brutal methods to crush them. 
Howev~r, the UN representative failed to visit the regions to 
make his own assessment. Moreover, he is quoted as actu-
ally c~md?nin~ security measures taken by the army that 
were m v10l~tlon of Pap.uan political rights on the grounds 
that Indonesia had the nght to act against 'anti-state activ-
ity', while ignoring the fact that this was in violation of the 
1962 New York Agreement. 
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Deliberate fabrication 
Meanwhile, Papuans were making their views known in 
the form of petitions to the UN. Saltford shows that Ortiz 
Sanz's claim that 'more than half were pro-Indonesian was 
simply untrue. For the purposes of his research, the author 
was able to examine 156 of the 179 petitions received by the 
UN up until the end of April 1969 and found that 95 were 
anti-Indonesian as compared to 59 that were pro-
Indonesian, with two being neutral. According to a 
comment by Ortiz Sanz, the pro-Indonesian petitioners 
were 'better educated and aware of the issues' while he 
described some of the anti-Indonesian petitions as 'unintel-
ligible' and spoke disparagingly about the alleged signatures 
being 'written by the same hand'. The author accuses the UN 
representative of deliberately misleading the UN General 
Assembly about the petitions and ?escribed this <l:s a 'cl~ar 
illustration of the UN leadership's collaboration with 
Indonesia to legitimise the latter's takeover of West Irian' . 
Once it had been established that the consultation would 
be conducted by meetings of regional councils, the UN 
mission should then have ensured that they would at least 
witness the election of the council members which it said 
would be the 'touchstone' of the democratic credentials of 
the Act. But the Indonesian authorities made it virtually 
impossible for them to witi:iess any elections. ~n Australian 
journalist, Hugh Lunn, himself saw how six men wer_e 
indiscriminately picked from a crowd to be council 
members. But on the same occasion, cheering erupted when 
two men and a boy appeared with placards denouncing the 
process as unrepresentative and warning of new waves of 
arrests· the three were led away at gunpoint. A Dutch jour-
' . . 
nalist with Lunn then appealed to Ortiz Sanz to mtervene 
but he replied that 'the UN was only _there t~ observe'. 
John Saltford's book is essential readmg for anyone 
wanting to understand the depth of betrayal surrounding the 
so-called Act of Free Choice that consigned the people of 
West Papua to become an Indonesian colony. But the UN 
would not have been able to get away with this without the 
collusion of western powers, notably the lJ_S, f\ustral!a, 1:'he 
Netherlands and Britain. The author's detailed mvestlgatlon 
also helps to explain the depth of anger still felt today by 
West Papuans at their shabby treatment by the UN. The 
sense of betrayal is all the more acute because of the exem-
plary way the UN conducted the referendum in East Timor 
in 1999. It gives further support to the reasons for the 
campaign launched last year to urge the UN Secretary 
General. Kofi Annan to conduct a review of the UN's 
conduct. However, the campaign is limited to the years 
1968 - 1969 whereas it is crystal clear that the UN behaved 
atrociously from the very beginning of its involvement in 
Papuan affairs in 1962. . 
Unfortunately, the price of the book, at £60, puts it 
beyond the means of most of our rea?er~ . All we can 
suggest is that you persuade your pubhc library or yo~r 
university library to stock a copy. 
Carmel Budiardjo 
BOOK REVIEW 
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building and formulating an operational programme. 
Those attending the workshop were urged to work out 
action plans suitable to their respective organisations for 
the year 2003. The Justice and Peace Offi~~ agreed to co-
ordinate an effective follow-up of the declSlons adopted. 
US mission refused entry 
A decision by a leading US foreign policy think-ta~, 
the Council on Foreign Relations, to send a special 
commission to Papua as part of an effort to suggest the 
way forward, was thwarted when Foreign Minist~r 
Hassan Wirayuda declared during a press conference m 
the US that the government would refuse to allow the 
mission to visit Papua. 
The commission, called: Indonesia Commission: Peace 
and Progress in Papua, is headed by Admiral Den_nis Blai~, 
the former US Pacific Fleet commander. Admiral Blalf 
was until recently, in his former role, a frequent. visitor to 
Indonesia to meet senior officers of the Indonesian armed 
forces. Admiral Blair denied that the commission had 
intended to visit Papua either on the invitation of the 
Papuan Presidium Council or the Indonesian governmen~. 
Jakarta's refusal to allow a mission, under such presti-
gious leadership, to visit Papua? shows how_ desper~tely 
the present Indonesian leadership fears any mternatlonal 
involvement in seeking a solution for Papua. The Jakarta 
Post quoted a government source as saying: 'We are trying 
to minimise the possibility that the presence of such 
foreign groups could lead us in the direction of anot~er 
fiasco like the secession of East Tim or form Indonesia.' 
[Jakarta Post, 2 December 2002] .. . 
Although it has been prevented from visiting Papua, the 
Commission has conducted its investigations based on 
extensive talks with Papuans and others abroad and plans 
to publish its report in February 2003. 
Flag-raisers arreste~ 
Despite efforts by the secunty forces to prevent Papuans 
from raising Kejora, the Morning Star, the Papuan flag 
adopted in 1961, flag-raising has continued to be a popu-
lar form of peaceful struggle in many parts of Papua. 
In Manokwari, more than forty people were arrested on 
26 and 27 November as the local police clamped down on 
a flag-raising ceremony that took place ~arly on ~he morn-
ing of 27 November. As soon as the pohce got wmd of the 
event, they arrived on the scene and_ pulled the flag down 
ten minutes later. There was no resistance on the part of 
those who unfurled the flag. Nevertheless, the police 
rounded up thirteen people on the spot and later rounded 
up another 29 people alleged to have been involved in the 
incident. Two of those arrested were women. It was later 
confirmed that the number of people arrested in 
Manokwari was 41. 
The flag-raising was held to commemorate a declaration 
of independence on 27 November 1997. Although most 
continued on page 28 
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Creating a Zone of Peace in Papua 
Turning Papua into a Zone of Peace is gaining momentum with a number of initiatives taken by 
civil society. But the security forces regard these efforts as being a cover for those wanting to secede 
from Indonesia. In November and December, flag-raisers were arrested, and Jakarta announced 
that it would not allow a US mission to visit Papua for investigations. Clashes in the border region 
with Papua New Guinea have threatened the security of Papuan refugees. 
In a major speech, Tom Beanal, the deputy leader of the 
Papuan Presidium Council (PDP) set out the Council's 
programme for 2003. He was speaking on 1 December 
2002, the anniversary of the day in 1961 when Papuans, still 
under Dutch control, made a formal declaration of their 
independence and the Papuan flag, Kejora, or Morning Star. 
Beanal was elected the deputy of the Council's leader, 
Theys Hiyo Eluay, and will retain that title until such time 
as Theys' assassination in November 2001 is properly 
resolved. He outlined the history of the Papuan struggle for 
independence and said that the so-called Act of Free Choice 
in 1969, conducted under the terms of the New York 
Agreement of August 1962 between the Indonesian and 
Dutch governments 'was nothing more than a conspiracy ... 
leading to the integration and colonisation of West Papua by 
Indonesia. The threefold result was: 1. Unbridled exploita-
tion of the country's natural resources, 2. Impoverishment 
of the Papuan people, and 3. A wave of atrocities, human 
rights abuses and crimes against humanity against the 
Papuan people.' 
Faced with a complex set of problems, he said that it was 
the responsibility of the Papuan people to seek a solution by 
means of Political Dialogue, that should be undertaken 
within the context of a revision of their history. He 
advanced a seven-point programme for the coming year: 
1. All components of the Papuan struggle must unite 
under the banner of One Nation and One Soul. 
2. The land of Papua shall be a Zone of Peace, free from 
violence, exploitation and greed. 
3. The agenda for 2003 must focus on reconciliation and 
Peaceful Diplomacy. 
4. The people must engage in a struggle for economic 
rights, social emancipation and cultural rights. 
5. The Papuan people must uphold human rights to 
achieve order and harmony in keeping with their reli-
gious beliefs and universal principles of humanity. 
6. All components of the struggle must support peaceful 
dialogue as the way to independence. 
7. Papuans must refrain from initiating wars or spread-
ing hatred on the basis of group, ethnicity or race. 
Writing in Indonesia's leading English-language daily, Fr 
Neles Tebay said that the idea of establishing a zone of 
peace in Papua was initiated by the Papuan Tribal Chiefs' 
Council at its congress in February 2002. He said that 
efforts to create a zone of peace has the full support of all 
parties in the province. 'The only institution which has 
rejected the idea is the Indonesian military (TNI).' A widely 
representative delegation of all sections of the Papuan 
people, headed by John Ibo, chair of the provincial assem-
bly had called on the Megawati government to declare 
Papua a zone of peace, but the appeal had been ignored. 
[The Jakarta Post, 17 December 2002] 
Catholic Church holds workshop 
The Office of Justice and Peace of the Jayapura Diocese 
has also taken up the issue of creating a zone of peace.In 
late November, it held a four-day workshop on making 
Papua a Land of Peace. The event was attended by 45 repre-
sentatives coming from a large number of civil society 
NGOs, members of the provincial assembly, representatives 
of all the religious communities in Papua, from academic 
institutions and from the press. 
Among the objectives of the workshop were to reach a 
deeper understanding of the components of 'peace-culture 
continued on page 31 
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